Preet Bharara:

From CAFE and the Vox Media Podcast Network, welcome to Stay Tuned. I’m Preet Bharara.

Ian Bremmer:

When he gets the nomination, he becomes far more powerful when all of the Republicans become loyal to him and the media and he gets the money for that run, then his policy pronouncements and his vindictiveness and his willingness to go after Biden and those around him will also grow exponentially.

Preet Bharara:

That’s Ian Bremmer. He’s the founder and president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm, and the founder of the Associated Digital Media Company, GZERO Media. Every year, Eurasia Group puts out a report of the top risks facing the world in the coming 52 weeks, and usually I have Ian on to break down the threat assessment. This year, the U.S. election looms large as do the ongoing crises in the Middle East, the prospect of an axis of rogues, and the risks of ungoverned artificial intelligence. Ian tells me what to be scared of in 2024 and somehow we even managed to laugh while we confront the specter of these risks. That’s coming up. Stay tuned.

Q&A

Now let’s get to your questions. This question comes from Twitter user, Eric Adair, or I guest X user Eric Adair, who asks, “In Judge Chutkan’s case, has DOJ violated the stay by continuing to provide discovery and file motions provided that the defense team is not obligated to review the discovery or respond to the motions while the stay remains in effect?” Well, that’s a very good question and it’s playing out interestingly in the D.C. courthouse. As you may recall, Judge Chutkan is overseeing the January 6th related indictment brought by Special Counsel Jack Smith, and at the moment there is a legal wrangle that’s going on that we’ve talked about many times relating to whether or not former President Trump has a absolute immunity in connection with the things he did in the lead up to January 6th. And while that appeal has been taking place in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and perhaps potentially eventually to the Supreme Court, all proceedings in the district court, the trial court under Judge Chutkan have been stayed, meaning paused. And she’s divested of jurisdiction.

Now, what’s operating in this case in all the other cases in the lead up to the election here in 2024 are not just legal principles and legal precedents, but also something very, very important for a practical reason. And that is the clock. And prosecutors in Jack Smith’s office and in the other prosecutor’s offices understand that there is a risk if these trials don’t take place in a timely fashion before the election, which could cause the return of Donald Trump to the White House. These trials may never happen for reasons that we’ve discussed before. So they’re trying mightily in every way possible without violating any order, without violating any stay to keep on track.

Because as Judge Chutkan has said, the deadlines are merely paused and they may resume. And so Jack Smith’s prosecutors are, I think, in good faith and understandably trying to make sure that if the case gets back on track and the decision is made by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, that Donald Trump loses in his arguments to dismiss the indictment, they can speedily get back on track to have this trial, which is set for March 4th. Now, March 4th, as I’ve said before, is a bit ambitious, giving these appeals that are going on, but I think it makes sense for the Jack Smith team to do everything possible to try to keep it on schedule notwithstanding this pause.

What’s interesting to me is the Trump team, in probably the most direct signal that all they care about also is the clock rather than principal legal argument, has filed a motion to hold Jack Smith in contempt. Why? For filing motions ahead of deadlines and providing discovery ahead of deadlines, even though, as you point out in the base of your question, that there is no obligation on the part of Donald Trump’s team to respond to the motions or to read the discovery or to review the discovery. In my time as a prosecutor in overseeing cases, there were many times where defense lawyers would complain that they’re not getting discovery quickly enough. There were many times they claimed that they were not getting notice of what arguments the prosecution was planning to make in motions or otherwise quickly enough. It’s a bit odd and unprecedented in my experience for the complaint to be that they’re getting discovery and information and notice of arguments and motions in advance of deadlines. I don’t see any way that that’s prejudicial to them in a real meaningful legal sense, and I expect Judge Chutkan to agree with that.

This question comes in a post from X user JL Sherman who asks, I think quite poignantly, “Why did the OLC, the Office of Legal Counsel, draft a memo prohibiting the federal indictment of a sitting president if presidents have immunity for the criminal official acts?” Well, that’s a great question and you get to a great point. To just put this in context for folks, this relates to the prior question. There’s an ongoing legal battle on whether or not former President Trump had absolute immunity for basically everything he did while he was in office if there’s an argument that it was an official act. Now, Jack Smith and his team and the government and most legal experts are putting forth the argument that there’s nothing in the text structure or history of the Constitution that says a president, when he leaves office, is immune in the way that Donald Trump has advocated and his lawyers have argued.

Your question gets in another set of arguments, which is essentially as far back as we can remember, everyone has been under the assumption that presidents when they’re out of office, when they’re no longer serving and they’re private citizens, are subject to criminal prosecution for certain misconduct that they engaged in while they were president. That has been what everyone has assumed. That’s why your question is a good one. Why on earth did OLC, the Office of Legal Counsel within the Justice Department, on more than one occasion make the effort to set forth a principle that a sitting president can’t be indicted if it was the case that he couldn’t be indicted after he was president too? Doesn’t make any sense. It’s not logical. It’s been the assumption and the understanding about Democratic and Republican administrations that people are subject to prosecution once they leave the Oval Office.

I’ll give you another example of this. It’s been brought up in the briefs and also by legal experts, and I think it’s a related point to this issue of the drafting of the OLC opinion. And that has very famously, back in the ’70s, President Gerald Ford issued a pardon to Richard Nixon and Richard Nixon accepted the pardon. If it’s the case, as Trump argues now that former presidents have sweeping absolute immunity based on the things they did when they were in office, there was no need for the pardon to have issued and there was no need for the pardon to have been accepted.

Now, a footnote to that is the Trump legal team in recent days has made the argument, “Well, that was different. That was not official conduct what Nixon was accused of doing and what he was pardoned for. That was unlawful campaign activity.” Sound familiar? Much of what is being alleged about Donald Trump is also exactly that, unlawful campaign activity in an attempt to overturn an election, so the argument goes. I’m generally loathe to make predictions about how courts will rule on various things, particularly things that are cases of first impression, even though the weight of evidence and legal reasoning is on one side rather than the other. But I do think that the argument this week did not go well for President Trump’s lawyers on this issue of absolute immunity and that the Circuit Court, the panel of three will rule against him.

This question comes in an email from Mr. Wind who writes, “Preet, if SCOTUS takes up the question of Colorado’s or Maine’s precluding Trump’s access to be on the state’s primary or general election ballots, then were the justices to overturn such decisions, depending upon the wording of the justice’s decision or order, will the implication necessarily be that Trump did not engage in insurrection? What effect might that have on the cases brought by Jack Smith or Fani Willis? Thank you.” Well, that’s a great question. Since you’ve written the question, I don’t know exactly when you sent the question in, but the Supreme Court has now said it is definitely taking up the matter of Colorado and Maine’s precluding Trump’s access to the state’s ballots in 2024. And you are correct that most of the focus on this question is on certain language in Section 3 of the 14th Amendment that refers to insurrection.

So for example, “No person shall be a senator or representative in Congress, in various other offices,” as set forth in Section 3, “who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” So that’s where the focus is. That could very well be the way in which the Supreme Court makes its decision about whether or not Donald Trump can be disqualified from the ballot in those states or other states. But it’s not the only way. And Joyce Vance and I discussed this on the CAFE Insider at some length this week. There are various other arguments that are being made that could be what some people call off-ramps for the Supreme Court or a majority of the Supreme Court to decide that he can’t be disqualified, that don’t have to do with this language relating to insurrection or whether or not he engaged in insurrection.

So for example, an argument has been raised that notwithstanding the language of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, that the courts don’t actually have the authority to be the enforcement mechanism for disqualifying someone from being on the ballot, that that must be done by Congress. That’s a technical procedural argument. So a court could decide that’s the basis for siding with Donald Trump on the disqualification issue. There’s another one that’s interesting that’s gotten a bit of attention, and that is the question of whether or not Section 3 of the 14th Amendment even applies to the person who’s seeking to be President of the United States.

I read a portion of Section 3 to you a second ago. It makes references to senators, representatives, electors, members of any state legislature, executive or judicial officers of any state, but it pointedly, in the minds of some people who are making this argument, it pointedly doesn’t refer to the President of the United States. So there’s an argument or a subset of an argument that the section doesn’t even apply to the president. That, of course, also doesn’t get to the issue of whether or not there was an insurrection or whether or not Donald Trump engaged in an insurrection. It would again be a procedural point.

And in fact, the trial court in Colorado agreed that every element of Section 3 was met with respect to Donald Trump being able to be disqualified, but for this one. The issue of whether or not it applies to the President of the United States. The Colorado Supreme Court in a split decision 4-3, effectively said, “That would make no sense. There’s some constitutional history that addresses this point and more commonsensically, it would be odd for the disqualification to apply to every single person who could run for office in the U.S. except for the most important one. That makes no sense at all.” So it is possible that the Supreme Court makes its decision directly on the ground that they believe the insurrection language is not satisfied, but there are these other ways they could decide it as well.

As for your question about what effect that might have on the cases brought by Jack Smith or Fani Willis, I don’t think really any. The Supreme Court case is based on this ballot issue, not on the criminal issues. And by the way, as you may appreciate at this point in Jack Smith’s case, even though there is a statute on the books that’s called insurrection, Jack Smith has not charged and the grand jury has not charged Donald Trump with insurrection. So a ruling from the Supreme Court on the Colorado ballot issue I don’t think has a bearing on Jack Smith’s criminal case.

I’ll be right back with my conversation with Ian Bremmer.

THE INTERVIEW

Ian Bremmer is an expert on geopolitical risk and he has a whole lot of predictions about this high intensity year. Ian Bremmer, my friend, welcome back to the show.

Ian Bremmer:

Preet, I have missed you so much over the last few weeks.

Preet Bharara:

Happy 2024.

Ian Bremmer:

Yes, indeed.

Preet Bharara:

It has been reported to me by my crack staff that this is in fact your 13th appearance in some form or another on the podcast. Can that be right?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. Lucky 13. We’re going to absolutely.

Preet Bharara:

13th’s the charm, as they say.

Ian Bremmer:

Absolutely. Wow, that’s a lot.

Preet Bharara:

For new listeners, you should know that I call you my Regis Philbin.

Ian Bremmer:

I have people that now write me saying, “When are you going back on Preet?” I mean-

Preet Bharara:

It’s been a week.

Ian Bremmer:

… it’s like I have some level of commitment. Yeah, exactly. Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

Well, Regis Philbin for the young folks was the most frequent guest on the David Letterman show, the original show, I believe. Late Night with David Letterman. Anyway, so we’re here every year for you to depress us with your top risks of the year. You put out this report, which is very thoughtful and very smart, some of which I will take some issue with. Fair warning, as I do every year.

Ian Bremmer:

You do, you do every year.

Preet Bharara:

I do every year. But before we get to that, I thought fascinating to hear because I haven’t spoken to you since you went on this somewhat unusual and rare Christmastime trip. You did not go to the warmth, did you?

Ian Bremmer:

I did not. I mean-

Preet Bharara:

You were not in the Caribbean. What would be the opposite of that? I guess the opposite of that would be…

Ian Bremmer:

Space, deep space would be the opposite of that-

Preet Bharara:

You didn’t go to deep space-

Ian Bremmer:

No, I didn’t.

Preet Bharara:

… You went to Antarctica.

Ian Bremmer:

I went to the South Pole. I did.

Preet Bharara:

So you had told me that you had planned a trip to the actual South Pole, but it wasn’t a guarantee that weather conditions were permitted-

Ian Bremmer:

Yep.

Preet Bharara:

… Did you actually make it to the South Pole?

Ian Bremmer:

I did actually make it, and I’ll tell you the worst thing about being that far south. And I don’t care how much it is summer there, it is bad. Is going to the bathroom.

Preet Bharara:

Right.

Ian Bremmer:

No, in the middle of the night-

Preet Bharara:

You had to lead with… You couldn’t lead with some of the other amazing things you saw-

Ian Bremmer:

It is so cold.

Preet Bharara:

… or experience you got-

Ian Bremmer:

It is so cold. No, this was an adventure. There was a lot of mountaineering and rock climbing and ice climbing, and I had people that really know how to do that which-

Preet Bharara:

You delegated that?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, no, but I was roped-

Preet Bharara:

When you said, “I had people who knew how to do that.”

Ian Bremmer:

… I was roped to that so that when I screwed up, it was much less likely I was going to cause grievous injury to myself, so-

Preet Bharara:

So is there a Four Seasons down there? What’s the accomodation-

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, yeah. No, there’s no infrastructure. There’s no permanent infrastructure other than the science bases that are there, the research bases. So I mean, some of it there-

Preet Bharara:

So is that where you slept?

Ian Bremmer:

No, no. Although I did visit a couple bases and that was great and super interesting, including the American base, which is the only base on the South Pole. And spent a bunch of time down there talking to them about some of the science experiments they’re doing and the weather they focus on, the satellite systems, all that… It’s really cool.

Preet Bharara:

Where did you sleep?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, when I was down in the Pole, I slept in a tent in a little makeshift camp that was isolated and not like where you and I usually sleep. But the base camp, which they set up for the Antarctic summer, that was actually perfectly comfortable.

Preet Bharara:

And what’s the prevailing temperature during the day and at night?

Ian Bremmer:

There were a few days where I was actually taking layers off given all the exercise. It got up to -5 and-

Preet Bharara:

Up to -5?

Ian Bremmer:

… and occasionally no wind. So I mean, think Chicago on a nice day in January. But there were times when it was down to about -30, -35. And on top of one of the mountains that we climbed, the winds were 60, 70 miles an hour. And that was absolutely brutal. I’ve never experienced anything like that in my life. One of the Norwegians on the trip said that there is no such thing as cold weather, only bad clothing. And I do beg to differ with that after this trip.

Preet Bharara:

And do I understand correctly that you paid money to go on this trip?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, yeah. I mean, it does cost to get there. But look, I think they have a total of 500 people that go to the Pole every year, and they are not tourists, most of them. So I’ve been all over the world. I’ve traveled to most places. I’ve never been to this massive continent with almost no people on it. So one, there was a human curiosity to it. But also, and this is pretty interesting, Antarctica is the first Cold War arms agreement that was structured where the Americans and the Soviets back in 1959 agreed not to militarize Antarctica, any of the continent or to exploit any resources there. And that treaty, which is pretty loosely written, has held up now for over 60 years and the next time the treaty has to be approved is in 2048. And there’s no reason why there are going to be any challenges to it before then. So I mean, this is actually a part of the world that we govern pretty well.

Preet Bharara:

Because there’s no people.

Ian Bremmer:

It helps that there’s no people-

Preet Bharara:

And it’s frigid.

Ian Bremmer:

And it’s frigid.

Preet Bharara:

That’s the best we can do. Okay, so that’s very interesting. I hope to hear more about your trip offline.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

So let’s remind folks who haven’t heard this annual episode of the podcast. You do this assessment of risk, geopolitical and other risk. Why do you do this?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, one, it’s really to talk about what we are expecting for the world in the coming year. So it’s back to school, it’s January, you’re kicking off the year. And how do we think about the world? And there are lots of ways to do that. We do it by looking at all of the top risks, which we rate on the basis of likelihood, imminence, and impact. And the whole organization spends and we’ve got about 250 people here, and we spend a lot of brainpower over the couple of months before the end of the year putting it together.

And we also look at red herrings. So the things that people think are likely to be risks that we think are not going to be risks. So a little optimism, a little hope at the bottom of the lamp. And then at the end of the year, we keep it on our website all year. And then at the end of the year we go back and we see how we did. And it’s actually, it’s quite a useful disciplining device for the whole organization and for the public that should be trying to keep us honest about this stuff.

Preet Bharara:

And for this podcast, let’s start with that.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

You were on the show almost exactly a year ago to talk about the top risks. How’d you do?

Ian Bremmer:

What do you think, Preet?

Preet Bharara:

I think not bad. I think not bad. I mean, some of these things appear again and again. I will note that last year, and you have interesting titles for the various risks. And you had what I thought was low on the list, Divided States of America. Last year was number eight. And a version of that, I take it this year, is number one. And you call it this year as compared to Divided States of America, you call United States versus itself. So it’s gone up in the rankings. And this is an issue that I talk about every single week on one or more of the podcasts. It’s gone up seven spots to number one. There are some things that I think were expected. China, you had a version of the China risk at number two last year-

Ian Bremmer:

Can we just go to number eight up?

Preet Bharara:

Yeah, yeah.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, so I-

Preet Bharara:

Number eight, this is number eight from last year.

Ian Bremmer:

Divided States of America from last year. Yeah. I mean, I do think… Look, at the end of the day, it was not an election year. People thought that the U.S. political system was going to be on pause as a risk. I didn’t think that that was appropriate. I think we saw that play out specifically with the drama in the House of Representatives where we didn’t have a Speaker for a period of time. And now of course it’s much weaker as a check and a balance. But I think we would’ve been very badly served by trying to put the United States towards the top because that risk just did not play out in a major way over the course of 2023.

Preet Bharara:

As a technical matter, if the beginning point is January 1, 2023 and the end point is 12-31-2023, I suppose that’s right because all the action… I mean, 2023 is prelude in part to the possible catastrophes of 2024.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, exactly.

Preet Bharara:

Electoral and otherwise. So you asked me what I thought, so I gave you my answer. How do you think you did?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. I think we did pretty well. I think that the biggest misses, I’ll start with the misses, were-

Preet Bharara:

Always start with the misses.

Ian Bremmer:

… were on the… Always start with the misses. Preet. That was pretty good. That was a good pun.

Preet Bharara:

Yeah.

Ian Bremmer:

Were the two that had the geo-economic flavor, the inflation shock waves, which were less of a short-term spike and more a longer challenge that’s going to play out over the coming year and years as well. So I think we overstated it last year. And the-

Preet Bharara:

You had it at number four. You had inflation shockwaves at number four.

Ian Bremmer:

Should have been a little lower, especially given how well the U.S. economy rebounded in 2023 and the energy crunch where we would’ve thought at the beginning of ’23 that oil prices would probably have broken $100 by the second half of the year, especially given all the geopolitical challenges. Then add the Middle East to that, which no one predicted the Middle East War between Israel and Hamas. That happened and still we didn’t see prices hit $100 and part of that was because the U.S. overproduced pretty dramatically. And also that agreement with the Venezuelans was a little bit of a surprise, helping them to produce a little more by the end of the year.

The rest of the report, all the other top 10 risks I feel very good about, particularly, I think we hit really hard this idea that China was going to surprise in underperformance in part because of Xi Jinping’s consolidation of political power and unwillingness to countenance internal debate in challenging his incrementalism, challenging his focus on politics and security and stability first, and not dealing with a big challenge on the back of zero COVID. Also, the obvious one, which I’ve spent a lot of my life focusing on rogue Russia. I don’t think it’s a surprise. It shouldn’t be a surprise that that war continued and did not go super well for the West over the course of 12 months. But that’s where we are and we certainly thought that was going to be the case back in ’23.

Preet Bharara:

Remind me, did you take a position last year on the likelihood of a recession in 2023?

Ian Bremmer:

No. No, we didn’t.

Preet Bharara:

So that was wise. Did you just not want to play or you didn’t think it was a likelihood?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, we’re not economists at the end of the day-

Preet Bharara:

But you talk about the economy a bunch.

Ian Bremmer:

… so I’d rather leave that. We do but-

Preet Bharara:

You talk about inflation.

Ian Bremmer:

… but we talk more about that in terms of how the political actors are going to affect these things so-

Preet Bharara:

Right, but a recession-

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

… A, would have been affected by political actors and B, would have affected political actors in other directions-

Ian Bremmer:

I know. I know.

Preet Bharara:

Well, I’m trying to have you explain why you copped out on the recession issue?

Ian Bremmer:

Copped out on the recession issue because I don’t feel like we had a very strong call, certainly nothing that made us feel counter consensus. So I don’t think you would have learned a lot from us if we had opined on it. And that’s a good reason not to say much.

Preet Bharara:

Well, that’s a win because you didn’t predict wrong. And lots and lots of people, people that you and I both know, felt very strongly that a recession was all but inevitable.

Ian Bremmer:

Look, I think if you look back on the last 25, 26 years since I started the company, one of the things we’ve been very effective at is not talking about stuff that we just don’t have expertise on. I think it’s a very important thing to do.

Preet Bharara:

Is that why George Santos is not on the list?

Ian Bremmer:

He should be because-

Preet Bharara:

He’s a major risk.

Ian Bremmer:

He’s-

Preet Bharara:

Well, he actually, kidding aside, he falls within number one.

Ian Bremmer:

Of course he does. Of course he does-

Preet Bharara:

He falls within number one, so let’s talk about this year’s-

Ian Bremmer:

He strongly falls within number one-

Preet Bharara:

Yeah.

Ian Bremmer:

… and yeah.

Preet Bharara:

So you have a clever name for the first risk, and it’s probably the risk that I spend the most time thinking about and talking about. The United States versus itself,. What does that mean?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, the other clever piece of it is that we say that there were three major wars going on in the world today, Russia versus Ukraine in its third year, Israel versus Hamas now it’s third month, and the United States versus itself. And of course it’s not a hot war, it’s a Cold War. But there are a lot of things that describe the principal actors, the adversaries who see each other as existential threats to the other and are fighting without any agreement on what the basic set of facts are. And also there’s no prospect that diplomacy is going to fix this.

And when you look at it that way, you go, “Oh my God, you’re right.” That the United States really is in that environment and we are in danger, perpetual danger of normalizing all of these things that have happened and are still happening in the U.S. political system that are unprecedented. And George Santos is one and most things involving Trump or another, the breaking of impeachment as a political check on the presidency, the inability of a House Speaker to exert authority over his own party. I mean, all of these things are getting… They are eroding. The institutions are getting weaker. American trust in these institutions is breaking down. You probably saw in the graphic, we looked at the way that people’s confidence in things from the Supreme Court, to Congress, to the presidency, to public schools, to newspapers, to television news, to news on the internet, to the church and organized religion-

Preet Bharara:

It’s all down.

Ian Bremmer:

… Every one of those, they are down radically and dramatically and near continuously through 2023. This is not a sustainable trajectory. The United States today in 2024 is a democracy in crisis. And by the way, it’s the only G-7 democracy that is in crisis. And I think that that is wildly-

Preet Bharara:

It’s an unusual dynamic.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

Unique. It’s unique in the last 50, 60, 70 years.

Ian Bremmer:

It’s unique. It’s wildly underappreciated by a bunch of people that have just gotten used to how much worse it’s gotten.

Preet Bharara:

Can I challenge you a little bit on how you characterize this first risk?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, sure.

Preet Bharara:

And maybe this is in the spirit of not appearing or trying to appear too partisan. But isn’t risk number one the chance that Trump gets a second term?

Ian Bremmer:

Not by itself, no.

Preet Bharara:

Why do you say that? Let me phrase it a different way, and you can answer either version of the question. If Biden wins decisively and in a way that, I mean, this may be unlikely to unfold this way. But if Biden wins decisively and remains relatively healthy, my guess is that the American risk, political risk will go down for next year. And if Trump wins, it will stay at the top or near the top.

Ian Bremmer:

And it’ll get worse.

Preet Bharara:

And it’ll get worse. So isn’t that a way of indicating my characterization that what’s really the risk is the Trump reelection possibility?

Ian Bremmer:

No.

Preet Bharara:

Okay, explain.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. So well first of all, you caveated that twice. You said if Biden wins in a really big way and then the health issue, but he would have to win in a very big and decisive way. Winning in a small way that is clearly seen as unacceptable and false and fake by nearly half of the population continues that risk. Remember, Biden has been president for the last four years. And over that period of time, Biden has certainly been willing to play by large the rules of law in the United States. And he certainly wants to have a more stable America. And yet the United States, its political institutions have actually deteriorated while Biden has been president, and belief and trust in those institutions has weakened while Biden has been president. There are a lot of reasons for that. But at some point you have to say, “Well, Biden just clearly doesn’t have the capacity to resolve this challenge.”

So if that’s true, a second Biden term from 82 to 86 years of age is highly unlikely to resolve what the first Biden term did not. Not least of which because the second time around, Trump is facing jail time and for a series of crimes that he and his supporters completely do not accept that he’s responsible for. Final point here is that this is 2024, not 2025. In 2024, Trump likely, overwhelmingly likely gets the nomination. When he gets the nomination, he becomes far more powerful than he is now, than he was in 2023, which is a big part of this risk when all of the Republicans become loyal to him and the media and he gets the money for that run, then his policy pronouncements and his vindictiveness and his willingness to go after Biden and those around him will also grow exponentially. I mean, I know the president a little bit, but I know the people around him a lot, as do you. And those people, a lot of them truly believe that if Trump becomes president, they will face legal jeopardy in the United States. And that’s-

Preet Bharara:

I mean, Trump has an enemies list, although luckily for the Biden people, they’re second in line after the disloyal Trump people.

Ian Bremmer:

That’s true. That’s true.

Preet Bharara:

So I’m not going to have the IRS on my tail until later in the term.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, he says he just needs to be dictator for one day. So I mean, who knows, it might be later in the afternoon for you, Preet.

Preet Bharara:

I mean, I’ve asked other guests this question. I’ve been thinking about it and it’s the proper year in which to think about it. From all of the expertise that you have, international, geopolitical, et cetera. Can you just describe in a minute or two what the risks, previewing a little bit? I know it’s premature because of the calendar, but preview a little bit what Trump 2 would look like if he were to be back in the White House. I’ll start with one. Likelihood of withdrawal from NATO is what?

Ian Bremmer:

Not my biggest concern, but likelihood that NATO starts to fragment, I think is pretty high.

Preet Bharara:

If that’s not your big… Ordinarily in recent political and international history, the fragmenting of NATO would be at the top of anyone’s list.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

So that’s a measure of how bad things will be that that’s not even close to the top.

Ian Bremmer:

Oh, no, no, no. I was responding to your question saying would the United States pull out of NATO. Not-

Preet Bharara:

Oh, you think the risk is not what you described-

Ian Bremmer:

It’s less that.

Preet Bharara:

Okay.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. I mean, so for example, we’ve got these two major wars that are going on right now internationally. Trump becoming president will have an impact on both of them. Trump says on the Middle East that if he was president, it wouldn’t happen because the Iranians know what happened when he was president. He went and he ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani for transgressions that were a lot smaller than what the Iranians are presently supporting in the Middle East against the U.S. and its allies.

So the likelihood that the war in the Middle East would expand dramatically to include the U.S. against Iran, that risk goes way up. Trump becomes president and you’re now talking about global recession. You’re talking about $150 minimum oil. Not to mention the broader security implications of what will look like a religious war. And again, this is in the context of Trump talking about having patriotism tests, particularly for Muslims trying to come to the United States. I mean, all this stuff. You can just imagine what that is going to look like as you have far more radicalization of Muslims, especially against the United States in that environment all over the world. So that would be one.

A second would be his relationship with Zelenskyy, who he sees as corrupt and very politically oppositional. When he wanted Zelenskyy to investigate Biden and his son, Zelenskyy said no. So I mean, Trump is going to throw Zelenskyy under the bus and won’t provide military support. That makes it much more likely Putin will be able to take more land and perhaps overthrow Zelenskyy, which is a much bigger threat to Poland, to the Baltic States. So you don’t need the U.S. to pull out of NATO for NATO to fragment. You need the United States to allow Ukraine to lose, and the Poles and the Balts going batshit crazy while the Americans are saying, “Not our fight and we’re not going to pay for that.” Well, you see how that could play out over just 12 months, nevermind four years. So these are very, very serious concerns.

Preet Bharara:

So a Trump victory assures him the number one spot on your list next year?

Ian Bremmer:

No. But I mean, you would certain… Look, the United States is the most powerful country in the world, and it’s also presently a democracy in crisis facing an unprecedentedly problematic transfer of power that may not be seen as free or fair and may not be peaceful. And so in fact, reasonably unlikely to be seen as free and fair and peaceful by substantial numbers of American citizens, not just a small percentage. So I think in that environment, the damage that comes from that is unlikely to recede in virtually any circumstance next year. But if Trump wins, it’s hard to imagine the U.S. being not towards the top of the list.

Now, we don’t know what other things are going to bump. We don’t know how much worse the Middle East War is going to get. We don’t know what the axis of rogues will look like. North Korea, Russia, Iran working together, driving chaos on the international stage, not interested in stability of existing international order and institutions. There are a lot of things that look deeply problematic over this course of the year, and I’m not in a position to tell you come 2025 is Trump clearly number one in and of himself. But given what his position would be and also given how powerful the U.S. is, it ain’t going to be back at number eight. That’s pretty clear.

Preet Bharara:

Yeah. So that was a preview of what happens if Trump wins and then his win is accepted. Now, let’s presume that Biden wins, but the win is not by a landslide, which is the worry that you have. The particular question I have is based on the people you’ve talked to and experts and your own thinking about it, the likelihood we will see significant violence and/or a coup and/or another insurrection, how likely?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, there’s a small but not negligible risk this time around that there will be real interference with the actual election. Cyber interference, violent interference, organized, disorganized, lone wolf, terrorist attacks, external, internal. That hasn’t happened over the last two terms. This time around, especially if Trump thinks he’s likely to lose, there is a lot more at stake for him and there is a lot more opportunity for American adversaries to stir chaos. So I think that is a real risk. I don’t know if it’s 5% or 20%, but I think there’s a real challenge that the U.S. election may not come off the way it is supposed to in November. Assuming that Biden, it does happen, it does come off and Biden does win, but it is a relatively thin win. And that’s the way most U.S. elections happen because of course there are only a small number of states that are actually in play with a relatively small number of voters.

The likelihood that Trump then having lost, facing jail, I mean, he is going to want to do everything in his power to gin up his supporters. Now, some of whom are in jail, having the insurrectionist from January 6th, but many of whom are not. And he’ll have tens of millions of people following him on X and on Truth Social that are going to be willing to listen to his call. And I think at a very minimum, that would lead to a number of red states that would have the kind of activity on the ground that we saw in Portland, Oregon a few years ago. Declaring local autonomy zones because they’re not going to be governed by an illegitimate government. And that’s going to cause violence. I think it’s almost impossible to imagine in that environment that you would have a free and fair, peaceful transition of power across the country. I don’t think you’d have a January 6th event because I think that security forces in the U.S. would be prepared for that and would lock Washington, D.C. down. But I think across the country you’d get a lot of that.

Preet Bharara:

I’ll be right back with Ian after this.

Let’s talk about risk number two that you’ve already alluded to, which is not very clever, but I think descriptive. Middle East on the brink.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, it’s not very clever. You’re right.

Preet Bharara:

No, but you don’t always need to be clever, Ian. I learned this. It took me a while to learn this.

Ian Bremmer:

That I didn’t need to be clever? Why did it take you so long to learn that-

Preet Bharara:

No. The one.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay.

Preet Bharara:

The one need not always be clever.

Ian Bremmer:

I felt like you knew that about me when we first met, really. It was right there.

Preet Bharara:

That’s definitely true.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

So you already talked about it and we’ve had other people on the show to talk about how they think things are going to unfold and play out.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. You and Freed had a good conversation about that-

Preet Bharara:

As we did.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

And as we sit here, it’s Tuesday, January 9th that we’re recording this and there’s already been discussion of, I don’t know exactly what these terms mean, but some discussion of a drawing down of forces in Gaza-

Ian Bremmer:

From Gaza

Preet Bharara:

… by Israel.

Ian Bremmer:

Yep.

Preet Bharara:

What do you make of that development and what do you make of Netanyahu’s position in all this? What seems to be a little bit of a fraying of the patience of the United States with respect to the conduct of the war. How do you think it’s going to play out over the next few months? And if you want to speculate as to best case scenario and worst case scenario, what do you think?

Ian Bremmer:

I think it’s really hard to… We’ll have to be very smart and very lucky in order to keep the war contained mostly, almost entirely within the confines of Gaza as it is and has been for the last three months. I think that will be an incredibly fortunate outcome. It is probably better than best case. And that’s the problem here is there are too many ways for this to escalate. You’re right that there is a drawdown, at least a limited drawdown from the troops that have been operating in the north of Gaza back to Israel. Now, if I want to be negative about this, since this is top risk we’re talking about, is the Israeli war cabinet does not want to be fighting a two front war at the same time. And if they are planning significant military action against Hezbollah in the north, they need to get some of those troops out of Gaza.

And it does appear that that is what they are planning, that the Israeli war cabinet, not someone, not just talking about Netanyahu, but the entire unity government is seeing this war as an opportunity to ensure longer term Israeli security vis-a-vis those organizations that do not recognize the right for Israel to exist. And that is not just Hamas. That is clearly also Hezbollah degrading their military capability, if not destroying them, and certainly pushing them back from the border area to a buffer that has been approved in a security council resolution but was never actually enacted by Hezbollah.

So that in addition to the assassinations of Hamas leadership and apparently Hezbollah leadership, at least some of it, makes it much more likely that that fight is going to open up. Then you’ve got the Houthis operating out of Yemen. Then you’ve got the Shia militants, the proxies of Iran and Iraq and Syria. And you have the radicalization of tens and tens of millions of Muslims around the world on the back of all of this military activity, some of whom will take violent action in their countries. So there’s just too many ways for this to go really badly, in my view, even if you were to wind down the war in Gaza. And there are no indications that you’re truly going to wind that down at this point.

Preet Bharara:

What about the U.S.? What are the scenarios or the circumstances in which the U.S. can get drawn in, in a real and more meaningful on-the-ground way? Or is that exceedingly unlikely?

Ian Bremmer:

No, it’s possible. We’re still a few steps from it. The next steps to watch would be if the Americans decide as the Houthis are ramping up their violence and the U.S. has warned them against it. It’s accomplished nothing so far. The U.S. might decide, could easily decide to engage in direct strikes against Houthis bases in Yemen that would expand the war and involve the United States much more dramatically. If the Israelis attack Hezbollah in a meaningful way, the U.S. provision of intelligence support, military support for Israel makes it more likely that the American troops will be targeted more broadly. If the Israelis hit Iran or if the Iranians get involved directly because their proxies are getting hit harder and are less likely to be able to sustain themselves, that would also bring the Americans in.

So we’re still a few steps away from that, but it’s absolutely plausible. And let’s keep in mind the broader implications for the United States here. Number one, the U.S. is incredibly isolated in its support for Israel on the global stage. Far stronger than any of its core allies and strongly opposed by all of the global south. Secondly, Biden, very vulnerable at home. A majority of Democrats in the United States have more support for the Palestinians than they do for the Israeli position. And Biden is on the other side of that as an avowedly pro Zionist president, vice president, senator for decades now. Not to mention the fact that if… So this is going to affect his reelection. I mean, I am… Today, I don’t have a high confidence on this call because we’re 10 months out, but today I would say that Trump is 60/40 likely to win. And this absolutely Biden’s-

Preet Bharara:

60/40. Okay. I have to conclude the podcast at this moment now.

Ian Bremmer:

Because it’s too high or too low?

Preet Bharara:

No, you just… I’ve been saying to people, which freaks out the people that you could imagine are in my friend group, when I say 47% Trump, which is unacceptably high-

Ian Bremmer:

47%. Yeah, it’s unacceptably high.

Preet Bharara:

But still below 50%.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

And you’re at 60%.

Ian Bremmer:

Psychologically, you just don’t want to get beyond 50% or that’s your actual analytic perspective?

Preet Bharara:

I think overall, I mean, what do I know, right? And we’re 10 months out, as you say-

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, we’re spitballing. I have no confidence. Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

My view is that if nothing else dramatically changes, Biden has a slight advantage and that people will-

Ian Bremmer:

So if he doesn’t get older?

Preet Bharara:

… come to their senses.

Ian Bremmer:

If he doesn’t get older, for example, in the next 10 months. If you could just keep it, just freeze it right there.

Preet Bharara:

Or not ostensibly so. So my operating premise is that Biden has a slight advantage and people will come to their senses and independents will vote for stability over a chaos and the second tour of revenge. But I don’t think it’s much. So I come in at 47% in that very non-scientific manner.

Ian Bremmer:

Right. I agree with that. And then I come on top of that and say that the United States is economically likely to have a tougher time this year around than the consensus, which seems very upbeat. And also that the geopolitical risks are likely to provide some surprises downside. And that the Middle East War specifically plays into that. There’s got to be a 20% chance that the U.S. and Iran are directly involved in military confrontation, and that would lead to a recession. And then I think Biden-

Preet Bharara:

Can you say that again? Because that’s a headline. 20% chance that the U.S. and Iran have direct military action against each other?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, some level of direct military action. I’m not talking about a full-on war, but I’m saying actual American military strikes against Iranian targets and vice versa. Yeah, I think that’s probably at least 20%.

Preet Bharara:

Can I ask you an ignorant question about that? Because it’s not my area of expert. Does Iran in any shape or form want that?

Ian Bremmer:

No. No, they absolutely don’t.

Preet Bharara:

And obviously the U.S. does not want that.

Ian Bremmer:

Correct.

Preet Bharara:

So this is one of those things that just happens in international relations and in the beginnings of conflict, it can just happen anyway.

Ian Bremmer:

People don’t want any of these major conflicts that are happening right now. They’re happening. It’s really unfortunate.

Preet Bharara:

Well, I don’t know. Hamas, didn’t Hamas want it?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, I think Hamas for a very long time didn’t want it. And then they-

Preet Bharara:

And look, when you have a belligerent and then a victim country, unlike what we’re talking about here with the U.S. and Iran, where I think credibly we can say neither side really wants to be in armed conflict with each other. Russia wanted to be in armed conflict with Ukraine, and Hamas wanted to be in armed conflict with Israel, so it’s not quite the same.

Ian Bremmer:

Russia wanted to be in armed conflict for a couple weeks with Ukraine-

Preet Bharara:

Yeah, yeah. That’s true.

Ian Bremmer:

… and then it to be over and not have anyone else get involved, and that was a massive misjudgment. They did not want to be remotely close to where we are right now. And Hamas was small pot shots, but certainly not planning anything so massive. And then over the course of the past years, the Palestinian position became increasingly tenable and Netanyahu took his eyes way off the ball. So in both cases, quite surprising to end up in a position that is really… Suboptimal doesn’t get you even close to saying where we are. And so yeah, I do think that if we end up in a shooting war of any sort with the Iranians, that makes it very, very unlikely that Biden can win.

Preet Bharara:

Can I ask you to say again, the last name of Bibi? The prime minister of Israel.

Ian Bremmer:

Netanyahu?

Preet Bharara:

Yeah. You say Netanyahu?

Ian Bremmer:

I do, yeah.

Preet Bharara:

As opposed to Netanyahu.

Ian Bremmer:

Is that wrong?

Preet Bharara:

I don’t know. I just wondered. Is it a political statement?

Ian Bremmer:

No.

Preet Bharara:

Who do you want to be the prime minister?

Ian Bremmer:

Netanyahu.

Preet Bharara:

Netanyahu. I don’t know. What I do know is Netanyahu. I noticed that for the first time. Maybe it’s pronounced Netanyahu, but I always thought you were making a subtle-

Ian Bremmer:

I’ve heard Netanyahu. Netanyahu seems a little bit nasal. It seems a little bit like-

Preet Bharara:

Well, it’s spelled N-E-T.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. But we pronounce E’s in so many different ways. I mean, Preet for example. We don’t say, you know, Pretanyahu. We don’t say that.

Preet Bharara:

Preet-a-porter. No, that’s true.

Ian Bremmer:

We don’t say Pretanyahu.

Preet Bharara:

We don’t say Pretanyahu.

Ian Bremmer:

We don’t say Pretanyahu. We don’t.

Preet Bharara:

Yeah, because that’s not anybody’s name.

Ian Bremmer:

Thank God. Can you imagine? It’d be a mashup of you-

Preet Bharara:

I would have to change it.

Ian Bremmer:

And Bibi. You’d be so different-

Preet Bharara:

I would have to change it.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, yeah.

Preet Bharara:

Can we jump ahead? Because you’ve been talking about Iran and the connection here, to risk number five. And you use this phrase already, and I wanted to ask you about it. So we had the axis of evil that was defined by George W. Bush. Who was in the axis of evil?

Ian Bremmer:

That was Iraq, it was Iran, and it was North Korea.

Preet Bharara:

All right, so now we have a substitute player in your axis of rogues, which doesn’t sound quite as dangerous as the axis of evil. And you have North Korea, Iran, and instead of Iraq, you have Russia-

Ian Bremmer:

Russia.

Preet Bharara:

… Why do you use that phrase? Is that your phrase or are you borrowing it?

Ian Bremmer:

It’s my phrase. No, it’s my phrase.

Preet Bharara:

So axis of rogues sounds like Falstaff in Shakespeare. It doesn’t sound that bad. What do you mean to convey by that?

Ian Bremmer:

Well, the rogue states in the way they are perceived by the West, they are pariahs. They are countries that you do not do business with. You maximally sanction. You do not consider them part of the established international order. You don’t invite them to summits, you don’t engage in active diplomacy, you don’t recognize them diplomatically. And these are states that as a consequence of that feel like they are not interested in playing by any of the rules of the international order, but instead want chaos. They want the Western countries to be undermined, to be divided, maybe even to be destroyed. And they’re still interested, of course, first and foremost in making sure that their power is maximized and their survival is assured.

What we have seen, two points that are relevant here. One is that they are working together and the Russians are getting the limited military support from around the world that they presently get is coming from Iran, drones and including building drone factories inside Russia and North Korea with massive amounts of artillery and ammunition. And the Russians are responding by providing them support in intelligence and technology and trade in commodities and other things. And the fact that you have these three countries, first of all, Russia is the most powerful rogue state by that definition we ever had. They’ve got 6,000 nuclear weapons, they’ve got a lot of energy production, they’ve got significant landmass and military, paramilitary, and cyber capabilities. That’s dangerous if that’s the way they’re behaving. And it is.

And the fact that the Iranians and North Koreans now have an actor that is of that level of chaotic impulse, providing them with diplomatic cover and economic support and technological expertise, that’s a dangerous thing. Now, final point, China is not a member of this group. The Chinese are certainly adversaries of the United States and they have very different values, political and economic system, but they don’t want America to fail. They understand that they need the existing international system to maintain its stability in order to do well themselves.

Preet Bharara:

Right. That’s good, right?

Ian Bremmer:

That’s good. But they don’t mind having the Russians and the Iranians and North Koreans having a level of political cover for what they do. And so the reality is that China’s actions have facilitated the creation and the strengthening of this axis to a degree. So that’s what we’re looking at.

Preet Bharara:

Can we talk about Ukraine quickly?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

And you basically are saying we have to get used to the idea of a partition to Ukraine. That’s actually the title of risk number three, partition to Ukraine.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, it’s super depressing.

Preet Bharara:

Yeah. So you were one of our first guests after that invasion happened, coming up on the two-year anniversary of that. How surprising is it to you that we’re at this point? Or once it was the case that Russia didn’t succeed in a three-day or a two-week takeover of the country, all bets were off in either direction.

Ian Bremmer:

I think that it was that definitely all bets were off. It was clear very early on that this was going to be a war that was going to last for a long time and it was going to change the geopolitical order. I remember that conversation you and I had when I said that the peace dividend is over. It’s over. And that Russia will be isolated for the foreseeable future, certainly as long as Putin is there. And there were no challenges, domestic challenges to Putin. The Prigozhin weekend was an interesting punt, but ultimately there were no defectors among oligarchs or ministers or generals against Putin. And he’s in a perfectly stable position inside Russia.

So we’re now, here we are at 2024 and Ukraine is having a hard time maintaining existing levels of military support from the U.S. They had a failed counteroffensive over the last six months. Nearly 20% of the territory is occupied by the Russians. The Ukrainians have no plausible way to take more of it back, and they’re running out of ability to fight in terms of manpower. Back in 2022, the average age of a new Ukrainian recruit was 26. Today it’s about 45. They’ve only got 44 million people. So I mean, their ability to continue to fight is limited and that’s going to make Zelenskyy more desperate. It’s going to strain the transatlantic relationship. I think last year we were at peak NATO. And even without talking about Trump coming back, it’s going to be a lot harder to maintain a strong consensus position among these allies as the war gets worse.

Preet Bharara:

Do you think that Zelenskyy… I think the answer is probably yes with respect to Putin in a different sense. How closely are they looking at the ticking clock with respect to the U.S. election and the possible return of Trump? How do you think that is or should be playing into the strategy of either Zelenskyy or Putin in trying to accomplish or resolve certain things before that happens?

Ian Bremmer:

I think if you’re Putin, you’re looking at it very clearly and strategically that this is potentially a massive win for you.

Preet Bharara:

Yeah. You just need to get to then. And I don’t think you have to concede anything until you find out if your ally is going to be back in the White House, right?

Ian Bremmer:

No reason to concede a damn thing until you find out if your ally is coming back to the White House.

Preet Bharara:

So what if you’re Zelenskyy?

Ian Bremmer:

If you’re Zelenskyy, I think you’re having a hard time looking forward a year right now. I think that the timeframe is, how do I just keep this fight going? How do I get enough money, enough weapons to keep going, to stay in power, to keep my country together, to keep my allies inside Ukraine on side, to not have opposition that’s threatening me inside Ukraine? I mean, this is a very challenging situation for Zelenskyy. I think it would be very hard for him to spend a lot of time looking forward to 2025.

Preet Bharara:

Do you think that because we have a transition period, and presumably we’ll know who the winner is on election day or shortly after election day and then there’s a couple of months, and if Trump is coming in or Biden is coming in, do you think there’s an opportunity for resolution during that period before the second term is set?

Ian Bremmer:

I think that the best hope is that you get the Ukrainians enough military support to last them through 2024. Biden has a shot at doing that with Congress. It’s not easy, but it’s possible. And then you work like hell with the allies to provide security guarantees for the remainder of Ukraine, bilateral guarantees from a bunch of allies, including the U.S. You try to get that done for the July NATO meeting in Washington. And then you give them a timeline, a timeframe of when they’ll be able to join NATO. It’s not in 10 years, it’s in two or three. And you get all the countries to support it. And if you can do that, and there are risks around that, there are risks in terms of risking the status of NATO and needing to stand up for the Ukrainians over time. And would the Americans really do that? And what happens if Trump wins? And all of that.

But that together with a Ukraine that has economic reforms and can join the European Union, they’ll still be missing 20% of their territory, but they will have a better trajectory for the remainder of that territory than they ever would have had before the invasion, either in 2022 or in 2014. That can look like a long-term win for the Ukrainian people. I mean, it’s hard to say win given all of the suffering and the war crimes and the deaths and the territory and everything else. And I use that term advisedly, but there is still a way to resolve this more successfully for the West. I would not bet on it. It is getting more challenging because look, we’ve had good reason to kick the can down the road on this. We didn’t want to force those conversations over the last year, year and a half because we didn’t need to. It wasn’t urgent. But now that it’s urgent, the position is much harder. It’s much more challenging, and it’s what happens sometimes when you kick the can on tough conversations. Those conversations don’t become easier, and that’s where we are with Ukraine.

Preet Bharara:

Here’s my segue to the next one. Maybe we could have easier conversations if we enlisted AI.

Ian Bremmer:

I think we should be enlisting AI.

Preet Bharara:

So you have as risk number four, and then I want to get to some of the things that are not on your list before we let you go. Ungoverned AI. Ungoverned artificial intelligence. How does one govern it?

Ian Bremmer:

One governs it by having governments work together with technology companies because the tech companies that control AI really have sovereignty over it. They’re the ones that know how it work. They’re putting the platforms together. So-

Preet Bharara:

That’s very easily doable, right?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, it’s really hard to do. Yeah. The Americans are closest to doing it and doing it of course also means lowest common denominator because the tech companies are only willing to play ball on issues that they see as fully aligned with their business models. So you get good governance on some issues, but no governance on others. The Europeans are taking a more maximus position on governance, but they’re not working with the tech companies. So harder to actually implement and make effective. And the United Nations, an initiative that I’m a part of and have the pen for, is trying to create at least some ground truth, some analytic agreement on what the nature of the challenges are between everybody involved in this process. So that could be helpful.

Preet Bharara:

Before I let you go, I want to talk about some things that are not on the list.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, sure.

Preet Bharara:

So climate, not on the list. Some people might be-

Ian Bremmer:

It’s on list.

Preet Bharara:

Well, you talk about El Niño. It’s a part of climate. But you write in the report, “Climate change has long been considered by many our greatest global challenge, but the world is on the road to responding collectively even though too slowly because everyone understands the nature of the problem.” Is that true, Ian? Everyone understands? Why do we have this controversy on the right and does Trump understand and is he going to deal with the problem appropriately if he gets back in office to continue with the theme?

Ian Bremmer:

We have 190+ countries in the world today that all accept that there are 442 parts per million of carbon in the atmosphere. They all accept that we have 1.2 degrees centigrade of warming. They all know how much deforestation has happened in different countries, in different regions of those countries around the world-

Preet Bharara:

Yes, but do all the incoming and potential future leaders of some of the most important of those countries, including the United States, agree what needs to be done to maintain or lower those emissions?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. That doesn’t mean they’re willing to do it, but the fact that you have such an agreement and that there are trillions of dollars being spent on a transition from carbon energy to post carbon energy, 90,000 people showing up at the COP Summit in Abu Dhabi and moving every year more and more in that direction, it is too slow. And as a consequence, we will end up at 2 to 2.5 degrees of warming as opposed to 1.5, which is what everyone was saying they wanted to absolutely get to. And a lot more people will die and a lot more forest migration, a lot more problems with animal species and coral bleaching and the rest.

So this is not a happy story, but we are on a pathway in the next two generations to have a world that is powered by post carbon, decentralized, abundant energy. And that’s a very exciting ultimate point, that we are on a path, the world is on a path to moving towards. And my point on artificial intelligence is that we need to have that kind of a global conversation on AI as well, which is very challenging to do because it moves a lot faster.

Preet Bharara:

Ian Bremmer, thanks again for being on the show. 13 is a charm, in fact-

Ian Bremmer:

Preetly Preet, great to see you as always.

Preet Bharara:

Netanyahu.

Ian Bremmer:

There you go. Preetanyahu is ready to go.

Preet Bharara:

My conversation with Ian Bremmer continues for members of the CAFE Insider community. In the bonus for insiders, we discussed the biggest red herrings of 2024, apparent risks that many fear, but that Ian thinks are overhyped.

Ian Bremmer:

Most of the other elections happening in the world, not the U.S., are going to be stable. India, Modi’s going to win easily. He gets to do more economic reform. Mexico, same thing with Claudia Sheinbaum, who AMLO wants to win. European Union, European Parliament, same thing. Indonesia post Jokowi. Prabowo, who he prefers likely to win. Those are big elections around the world. They’re pretty stable.

Preet Bharara:

To try out the membership for just $1 for a month, head to cafe.com/insider. Again, that’s cafe.com/insider.

BUTTON

Before we wrap, I want to highlight something that came up on our show this week. On Stay Tuned in Brief, I spoke with Michael Gottlieb, who represented two Georgia election workers in their defamation suit against Rudy Giuliani for false statements he made in the aftermath of the 2020 election. As you may know, a D.C. jury ordered Giuliani to pay $148 million in damages. As we discussed, the mother-daughter plaintiffs Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, are undoubtedly patriotic public servants. Elections would just not be possible without people like them. These two innocent election workers suffered severe harassment and abuse after Giuliani accused them of falsifying ballots, and their lives will never be the same again. The court’s ruling is just the beginning of their journey to rebuild their lives.

But something else was harmed too in the aftermath of the 2020 election. It has become increasingly difficult for election officials to recruit poll workers who are imperative to the functioning of democracy. According to Brookings, as many as 1 million everyday Americans volunteer as temporary poll workers in a federal general election. To be sure, this recruitment challenge existed before 2020. But the increase in harassment and even death threats, breaches of voting equipment, and violent interference with election results have made things much worse. Many previous poll workers just aren’t returning to the job, and election officials are worried about their ability to staff up for this major election year. It may be hard to believe, but the presidential election is already upon us. The Republican presidential primaries kickoff this month with the Iowa caucuses on January 15th and the New Hampshire primary on January 23rd.

Election officials are preparing for another challenging election with foreign, domestic, and technological threats. I’d be lying if I said I wasn’t extremely worried about this election. Our democracy is at stake. Our country is at stake. And part of that worry is over these extreme and unjustified attacks on our election workers and on our democracy. So as we all gear up for this big year, I just want to commend election workers all over the country. Thank you for your work. Thank you for your service. And I do encourage those of you if you are able to consider doing this sort of noble work come election day. And if you’re interested in hearing more about the plaintiffs in the Giuliani case, be sure to check out Monday’s episode of Stay Tuned in Brief with Michael Gottlieb.

Well, that’s it for this episode of Stay Tuned. Thanks again to my guest, Ian Bremmer.

If you like what we do, rate and review the show on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen. Every positive review helps new listeners find the show. Send me your questions about news, politics, and justice. Tweet them to me at @PreetBharara with the hashtag #AskPreet. You can also now reach me on Threads, or you can call and leave me a message at 669-247-7338. That’s 669-24-PREET. Or you can send an email to letters@cafe.com. Stay Tuned is presented by CAFE and the Vox Media Podcast Network. The executive producer is Tamara Sepper. The editorial producers are David Kurlander and Noa Azulai. The technical director is David Tatasciore. The audio producer is Nat Weiner. And the CAFE team is Matthew Billy, Jake Kaplan, and Claudia Hernández. I’m your host, Preet Bharara. Stay Tuned.