Preet Bharara:

From CAFE and the Vox Media Podcast Network, welcome to Stay Tuned. I’m Preet Bharara.

Antony Blinken:

This is essentially the plan that we developed and more or less left in a drawer for the incoming administration, and I’m very, very glad they picked it up. I was working with all of the parties on what would be necessary for post-conflict arrangements in Gaza, and the basic idea is contained in this plan.

Preet Bharara:

That’s Antony Blinken. He was the 71st Secretary of State serving under President Joe Biden. As the nation’s top diplomat, he worked on restoring U.S. ties with allies and multilateral institutions following Trump’s first term. He also led U.S. aid responses in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war in Gaza after the October 7th Hamas attack. Both of those wars rage on today. Secretary Blinken joins me to discuss Trump’s latest peace proposal for Gaza, the president’s recent about-face on Ukraine, and the relevance of the U.N. After the interview, I’ll answer your questions about the Comey indictment. That’s coming up. Stay tuned.

Former Secretary of State Antony Blinken shares his thoughts on Trump’s latest peace plan to end the war in Gaza. Secretary Blinken, welcome to the show. It’s good to have you.

Antony Blinken:

Preet, great to be with you.

Preet Bharara:

You get to keep being called secretary? You keep the honorific? How does that work?

Antony Blinken:

I’m trying to retire it. Tony’s good enough.

Preet Bharara:

Well, you retired the H from Anthony already.

Antony Blinken:

Well, that’s a longer story.

Preet Bharara:

And it confuses a lot of people. It’s great to have you for a lot of reasons. We booked this appearance I think a lot of weeks ago. We are recording this … I should timestamp it for listeners because the world is an ever-changing place. It’s Tuesday, 2:00 P.M. Eastern Time on September 30th. And among other things there have been two very significant, I think, turnabouts in the international sphere. One relating to Israel, the other relating to Russia and Ukraine. Let’s talk about Israel first and can you help us understand what is going on, Tony? There’s a proposal for a peace plan that has lots of planks.

Antony Blinken:

That’s right.

Preet Bharara:

My rough initial scanning of headlines and bylines suggests that a lot of people have a lot of optimism about the nature of the peace plan, the proposal. I’ve heard more good things about this than about pretty much anything else in the foreign relations arena with respect to Donald Trump. Am I wrong about that? And either way, what’s good about it and what’s not good about it?

Antony Blinken:

I guess I’d answer yes, but because this is the Middle East.

Preet Bharara:

Yes, but.

Antony Blinken:

This is Gaza and it’s so extraordinarily fraught that it’s hard to know as we sit here today actually where this is going to go. But I do think it’s cause for some hope. I certainly hope that the plan gets fully accepted, fully adopted, and fully implemented by everyone.

Preet Bharara:

So you like the plan?

Antony Blinken:

Well, I like the plan in no small measure because, forgive the … What’s the right word? In false modesty. But this is essentially the plan that we developed over many months and more or less left in a drawer for the incoming administration and I’m very, very glad they picked it up. I was working with all of the parties, the Israelis, the Arabs, the Palestinians and others on what would be necessary for post-conflict arrangements in Gaza. And the basic idea is contained in this plan and that’s the notion of having these transitional authorities and forces come in to do security, to do governance, to begin the rebuild and eventually to hand over fully to the Palestinians. This enables a few things. It’s an opportunity to end the war. It’s an opportunity to return the hostages. It’s an opportunity to relieve the Palestinians.

All of that is there. Now, there are lots of trap doors and challenges that will come in its implementation, not the least of which is will Hamas accept it? Will the Israelis really go forward with it? And there’s some loopholes that they could drive a truck through if they wanted to. But the basics of the plan, exactly what we had worked on for many months. We had a pretty basic agreement on this plan back in November, but there were a few gaps that we weren’t able to close, and I hoped we could close them before we left office. We couldn’t quite get there. I thought what would happen is if we finally got to the ceasefire, which we did on our last day in office, the ceasefire had built into it a six-week period for an initial ceasefire. And during those six weeks, the parties would have to agree on what are the enduring conditions necessary to make this a permanent ceasefire, and that’s where this plan came in. This was what was necessary to get something that would be enduring. And I had hoped that during the first six weeks of the ceasefire back in January, February, they’d use that time to actually finalize the details of the plan, get everyone on board and move forward with it. Well, it seems like we’re finally there. I wish that this had happened seven months ago.

Preet Bharara:

So why did it not?

Antony Blinken:

Well, again, as they say, it’s complicated. A lot was going on.

Preet Bharara:

We have time. We have some time.

Antony Blinken:

Well, I think President Trump may have come in with a different vision of what he anticipated and wanted Gaza to be. You heard talk of Gaza on the Riviera, et cetera. Any new administration coming in, doesn’t matter who it is, is going to take time to get organized. And so I think it took them a while to really get to this. And as a result, the six weeks of that initial ceasefire expired and Israel went back to war instead of trying to move to the second phase of a ceasefire, an enduring ceasefire based on this plan. But again, we’re hopefully there now and my most fervent prayer is that this goes forward and that we hold everyone to it.

Preet Bharara:

So from the perspective of Benjamin Netanyahu, he has said publicly that he is supportive of the plan. He has endorsed the plan. Some people suggest that he tells the truth privately and not so much publicly and other politicians it’s the reverse. What do you think is the case here?

Antony Blinken:

Well, Tom Friedman has a pretty good rule for the Middle East, which is-

Preet Bharara:

Yes.

Antony Blinken:

Listen to what people say publicly and in their own language, not in English. So let’s listen to what the prime minister is saying in Hebrew to his populace. Let’s listen to what our partners and others are saying to their people in Arabic. Throw out the English. Look at what they’re actually saying to their own people. And so there’s some gaps between what he’s saying in one language and what he’s projecting in another. And look, as I said, there are loopholes in this agreement because for example, to get to the point where the Israelis are pulling out all of their forces from Gaza, first and foremost, the drawdown is tied to the progress that’s been made on disarming Hamas, which is a very, very challenging issue and one of the most difficult parts of this agreement. Second, the full withdrawal of forces is tied to an assessment that there’s no resurgent terror threat coming from Gaza.

That’s very much going to be in the eyes of the beholder. But what’s critical about it, the way it’s written now … And this is why, again, maybe some grounds for optimism. What the agreement says as I read it is in the areas that are currently free of Hamas and free of terror, this agreement moves forward irrespective of whether Hamas accepts it, irrespective of what the assessment is of disarmament, irrespective of what the assessment is of what’s going on in other parts of Gaza. And that means, again, based on the paper, that the force, once established, would move in, Israel would hand over to it, governance would take over by this interim administration, Palestinians fully involved, rebuild would start, massive surge of humanitarian assistance to bring people some relief. And also, maybe most importantly, as that goes forward, it creates a totally different vision and a totally different reality for what Gaza can be.

And I think people in Gaza, given the horrors of the last two years, at least there’s a chance that they would rally to that and that would further isolate Hamas. One of the big, I think, fundamental mistakes that Israel has made in the conduct of this war, a war brought to the world by Hamas on October 7th, was the failure to see that you not only need a military answer to Hamas, you need a political answer to Hamas, you need an alternative. And unless and until you have one, there’s always going to be some political wind in Hamas’s sails or Hamas 2.0, whatever it is. Creating an alternative is the best way to do that and the agreement also talks about building a credible pathway to the realization of a Palestinian state. That too is absolutely critical because it gives a positive political vision for Palestinians who deserve it and who need it, and it also, again undermines Hamas.

Last thing on this. Some people say any settlement here unless and until Hamas is totally eradicated, which is a totally illusory fool’s errand, but the people who say that say anything short of that is going to reward Hamas. Well, the reality is the biggest opponent for decades to any kind of answer to the challenges between Israelis and Palestinians, to a two state solution in particular has been Hamas, the Oslo Accords, which put us on track to a two-state solution. The answer from Hamas, massive acts of terrorism. When the Arabs all came together in the early 2000s, the Arab Peace Initiative, also to put this on the table, what happened? Hamas engaged in horrific attacks to try to derail it. So far from being a reward to Hamas, moving down that track to a Palestinian state with a secure Israel next door is the biggest possible rebuke to Hamas. And unless, again, you have a political answer to this question, you’re never going to solve it.

Preet Bharara:

You made this point a few minutes ago about the absence of Hamas from this process. How can you have a viable proposal if one of the main parties involved that started this whole thing wasn’t at the table? It’s hard for people to understand. And then second, I’ll ask you my follow-up question after it, but I’ll give you a preview, and it’s why should anyone presume that Hamas is rational in any way that political actors in the international sphere deem as rational?

Antony Blinken:

Well, you certainly shouldn’t presume that they’re rational, but you also have to look at how they might see their interests, even if they look at it in a very different way than we do and even if it’s not through the same prism of logic that we might have or another party would have. But to get to this question, look, the short answer is right now the jury’s out. We don’t know. But the way this has worked all throughout ever since October 7th is other parties have been the bridge, the communicator to Hamas. In particular, the Qataris as well as the Egyptians. And they’re able to bring things to them, eventually to get decisions from them, whether it’s an interim ceasefire hostage deal that we got way back in November of 2023, whether it’s the deal that we got at the end of our administration for the larger ceasefire and hostage release deal or smaller things along the way.

So there’s not only a way to communicate with them, there’s also some kind of very loose structure that one way or another allows them finally to get to a decision. So that’s where things are now. As I understand it, at least what I’m reading in the press, the Qataris in particular are sharing the plan with them and they’ll have to take it on board. But there’s a critical element that I think has changed, and I wish it happened a lot earlier. For the first time, just some weeks ago, all of the Arab countries came together and demanded that Hamas put down its arms, give up the hostages, and if necessary, leave Gaza. If that had happened a year ago, a year and a half ago, maybe we’d be in a different place. Better late than never, but it’s really unfortunate it was so late. And there are a couple of countries that have particular leverage over Hamas. Qatar is one of course, but so is Turkey. And if the word to Hamas is if you don’t do this, you’re cut off, you’re not going to have a safe haven, a safe harbor, you’re not going to have financial assistance, you’re not going to have any other kinds of support, well, maybe that concentrates their minds to make a decision.

Preet Bharara:

I understand the point that there have been breakthroughs and some successes along the way by other actors, third parties negotiating between and among themselves with Hamas off to the side. Is it not possible to negotiate directly with Hamas? Is it a bad idea to negotiate directly with Hamas? Is that another type of fool’s errand? Does it always have to be this proxy negotiation process?

Antony Blinken:

Look, I wouldn’t stand on ceremony. If there were an opportunity, if need be, to engage directly, sure. At various times, different parties have resisted that. We’ve done this kind of kabuki dance where you talk to the intermediary, the intermediary talks to Hamas, Hamas talks to the intermediary, the intermediary comes back to you. But as a matter of principle, I wouldn’t not do it. But thus far this system, with all of its challenges, has worked to get to decisions.

Preet Bharara:

Is the reason that this is the dynamic in part because it’s a better negotiating position for Hamas? Is there rationality in how they think about the negotiating dynamic? And if so, should there have been more efforts to negotiate directly with Hamas? Who is advantaged and who is disadvantaged by their absence?

Antony Blinken:

Look, I think, Preet, a big part of the challenge leaving that piece aside has been that who are you actually talking to and do they have the authority to make decisions? By definition, the folks that the intermediaries are talking to, the Qatars and the Egypts, are folks who are on the outside. Many of them living in Doha. And then of course the folks who were inside. And at different stages of this horrible conflict, different people have had more or less authority to actually make the decisions. And until about a year ago when Hamas’s leader inside of Gaza was killed, basically he was the decision-making authority. When he was killed, a lot of that actually moved out of Gaza into Doha. And so the committee of people that were in Doha probably had more authority and the ability ultimately to make decisions. They still confer with whoever was left in Gaza, but it’s a changing dynamic and that complicated things as well.

Preet Bharara:

So what’s the timetable here? I date stamped this. We’re talking on Tuesday. This podcast doesn’t drop until Thursday. If you had to guess, where will the world be? Where will the Middle East be at this point in 48 hours?

Antony Blinken:

Well, I think it’s incredibly hazardous to guess. I’d say that chances are by the-

Preet Bharara:

That’s why you’re the guest and I’m the host.

Antony Blinken:

Chances are by the time this podcast drops, I doubt we’ll be materially further along. Maybe there’ll be an answer from Hamas between the time we’re speaking right now and a couple of days from now. But even if there is, this is going to play out over some days, some weeks at least. Because as I think positive as all of this is, it’s a basic framework. They’re basic principles that are in the deal, basic steps, but not in some cases the necessary details that have to be worked out. And all of that’s going to take some time. And the question is, meantime, what’s actually happening? Look, Preet, a long time ago, the Israelis at great human cost accomplished what they said they wanted to accomplish. A year ago this summer, they, by their own reckoning, had destroyed Hamas’s military organization and so its ability to do another October 7th. They’d also killed the leaders who were responsible for October 7th.

The only thing they hadn’t done that they said they wanted to do is get the hostages out. So perpetuating this war, and again, at horrific costs to people who are caught in this crossfire of Hamas’s initiation, is not going to achieve much except to further isolate Israel in the world and further do damage to people in Gaza. So the question is now every effort should be made, every effort should be made to finally, belatedly end this, land this so that the hostages could get out, people in Gaza can finally get some enduring relief and we can point to a better future, not the horrors of the last couple of years.

Preet Bharara:

International and diplomatic negotiations are not my forte, not what I understand, but I understand in other realms how negotiations work. So someone makes a proposal and there’s usually a time or temporal element. The judge is going to decide something. I will have to invest a lot of things. There’s another buyer for the property. There’s something that motivates the other party or significant parties in the negotiation not to sit back and wait indefinitely to see how the world changes or the market changes, et cetera, et cetera. They got to act. What is the equivalent of that here for Hamas in terms of timing?

Antony Blinken:

There are a few hints that we’ve gotten just in the last 24 hours in both the proposed deal itself as well as some of the things that President Trump has said in discussing it. One is this notion that this whole process needs to start within 72 hours, that is hostages released. I’m not sure when the-

Preet Bharara:

Or what?

Antony Blinken:

Not clear, except that that’s the other hint he gave. He basically said at some point, if Hamas doesn’t go along, then over to the Israelis to do whatever they think they need to do.

Preet Bharara:

But isn’t that the status quo?

Antony Blinken:

It is, but the status quo is horrible and it’s horrible for everyone. First and foremost, for the Palestinians, for the people who are caught up in the midst of this, but also I believe for everyone involved, including the Israelis. Because what’s the dynamic now absent going along with this agreement? The dynamic is Israel is going to be left holding the bag on an insurgency that’s likely to go on for years. By our calculations, Preet, as many Hamas militants who were killed over the course of this, virtually all of them have been replaced with new recruits. Now, maybe very young men who aren’t experienced don’t have necessarily the same capacity, and the military organization of Hamas has been totally destroyed. But in terms of the number of people with guns, it’s not a lot less than it was when all of this started. And that means if Israel is stuck in Gaza, it’s stuck with an insurgency. It will be bled. It will have to keep churning reserves because the Israeli military is based on reserves.

These are people who are pulled out of their lives, pulled out of the economy, put into Gaza. And of course, most important, the suffering that we’ve seen will continue israel’s place in the world will continue to be in a precipitous decline. It’ll be increasingly isolated. It’s a terrible dynamic, and it’s all the more terrible because the opportunities that are there in a totally different direction to finally integrate Israel into the region, to have normal relations with virtually everyone, to be more secure, to have an even greater economic future, to isolate the big problem actor in the region, Iran, all of that is there for the taking, but it requires Gaza to end and it requires a real pathway for Palestine and its future.

Preet Bharara:

I’m going to get to American public sentiment in a couple of moments because that’s kind of stunning according to a recent poll in the New York Times. But before we get to that, where is Israeli public sentiment and how does that factor into Netanyahu’s thinking?

Antony Blinken:

Yeah. It’s a really good question because I think one of the mistakes that’s been made over the last couple of years since October 7th is to equate everything that people don’t like about what Israel’s doing with Prime Minister Netanyahu or maybe some of the people around him. It’s a lot more complicated than that. I think certainly for the first year of the conflict, I would venture to say that probably 80% of the Israeli public, if not more, supported the policies of the prime minister. Even the 50% that can’t stand him. This was a societal issue, not simply a question of one particular political leader or group of leaders. And that’s a reflection in turn of the trauma of October 7th. A trauma that was never really digested, understood by the international community because things moved so quickly after October 7th with the Israelis going into Gaza, and that’s where the focus was. So now-

Preet Bharara:

It was 80% in the beginning. Where is it now?

Antony Blinken:

Yeah, look, hard to say. It’s less because I think if you look at the polling that I’ve seen, most Israelis want the war to be over. Most Israelis want the hostages to be returned. That that’s the most important goal. Most Israelis, I think, believe that the continuingness for virtually no gain, but a lot more pain for Palestinians and Israelis and Israel’s standing alike just doesn’t make sense.

Preet Bharara:

What is the role of American public sentiment? There was this poll in the New York Times, as I mentioned, that lots of people are talking about that very specifically points to the number of Americans, how they answered a particular question. Do you think Israel is intentionally or unintentionally killing civilians? In December ’23, the number was 22% intentionally killing civilians. Today that number is 40%. Discuss.

Antony Blinken:

Yep. Hey, that poll, I’ve read the poll, I’ve read the other questions and the findings, is pretty devastating across the board for Israel, for its standing in the world, but particularly for its standing with its most important partner, and that’s the United States. And something that’s happened more broadly in the world over many years, Israel going from the David to the Goliath, is now increasingly the way Israel is seen in the United States. And for the government right now, I think they probably figured that the Democratic Party is largely a lost cause and they may not care. But the reality is you’re also starting to see a shift in numbers on a generational basis among young Republicans, evangelicals. And if that really sets in, they’ve got a huge generational problem and something that they really have to account for in their actions.

Preet Bharara:

Is that slide from 22% to 40% unfair, or is it understandable or is it deserved or some combination of those things?

Antony Blinken:

It’s a usually complicated question, and I think you have to look at different points along the way since October 7th. We focused very hard when we were in office on trying to use our influence as best we could to minimize civilian harm and to make sure that people were getting what they needed to survive. And we were in an almost daily, not just conversation, but daily argument with Israelis over that and over the policies they were pursuing to deal with something they had to deal with, which was just making sure that October 7th didn’t happen again. The very first time, Preet, that I went to Israel after October 7th was three days later. And at that point in time, they were refusing any assistance of any kind to get into Gaza. There was basically a blockade on. And I spent nine hours arguing with the prime minister, with the government on the imperative of allowing humanitarian assistance to go into Gaza.

I told them it was the right and moral thing to do, but even if they disagreed with that, it was the necessary thing to do strategically and legally. And ultimately, after a few days … I had an argument that lasted nine hours. Ultimately, they agreed. President Biden came a couple of days later. They opened up the first crossing at Rafah. Stuff started to come in in very small amounts and slowly, and we built on it and we built up on it. And at the same time, we were also looking as carefully as we could at what their rules of engagement were. And at least early on as we saw it and what was given to us, it was pretty close to the rules of engagement we would’ve imposed on ourselves. But then we were seeing a gap between the intent as expressed in those rules of engagement and the results that seemed to be happening on the ground.

Now, this was a unique situation, especially in the first year or so, where unlike just about any other place I can think of, maybe with the exception of Iraq, you had an enemy group totally embedded with the civilian population, living among and underneath schools, houses, hospitals, mosques, making it extraordinarily difficult to deal with the group that had attacked you so viciously without harming those who were caught in the middle. And there was an ongoing constant argument with them about the need to prioritize civilian safety as well as humanitarian assistance. Now, I think over the last six or seven months, I’m no longer privy to the details, but at least as an observer, it seems that it’s gotten worse in terms of what appears to be more indiscriminate firing in Gaza.

Preet Bharara:

So Hamas has been a threat to Israel, Hamas is a terrorist organization, and in the short term, I understand why a lot of attention is being paid to the threat of Hamas. On the one hand, their abilities have been degraded monumentally, the leaders have been killed. On the other hand, as you point out, I think you said something like it’s a fool’s errand to eliminate them completely to every last man.

Antony Blinken:

That’s right.

Preet Bharara:

But my question is, what about the threats from people who will harbor for a long time, if not the rest of their lives, an animosity towards Israel based on lots of things that have happened in Gaza in the medium term and in the longer term? Do the people who advise Netanyahu or the people who think about these things and construct models about these things … Is there enough data to understand what those trends will be and what future terrorist organizations may arise because of the events that have unfolded in the last two years? Is that a clear question?

Antony Blinken:

Yeah. Preet, I think it’s an essential question, and I think it’s almost inevitable just based on human nature that-

Preet Bharara:

But is that risk discounted because it’s a longer term? And is it discounted to the detriment of Israel?

Antony Blinken:

I think it’s discounted for a couple of reasons. It’s discounted to the extent that the basic mindset … And it’s really important to understand this, even if you disagree with it. The basic mindset is particularly in that part of the world, and particularly from Israel’s perspective, if you’re not showing strength, if you’re demonstrating weakness, if there’s blood in the water and it’s your blood, the sharks will always come to get you. And the only response from this perspective is to always show strength. If someone’s coming at you, hit them in the face 10 times harder and don’t stop until they’re dealt with. That’s the basic-

Preet Bharara:

But who do you hit in the face? Who are you hitting in the face?

Antony Blinken:

So the problem is that’s exactly right. First of all, you can’t do that with every single militant. And to your point, given the horrors of the last couple of years, there’s no doubt that you’ve got a whole new generation. But here’s the thing, and this is where it’s really complicated. You already had a generation of people who, by what they were learning in school or by what they were hearing in a mosque, were continuing to be radicalized. And that’s something that needs to be dealt with too. And again, if there’s no alternative, if there’s no alternative vision, if there’s no alternative that actually promises a better life and promises to meet the basic aspirations of people, you can bet that they’re going to go to the extremes. And whether it’s Hamas 2.0 or maybe even worse, if it’s possible to believe, a jihadist group of some kind, that’s likely to be the future.

So I think two things are incumbent. One is there really has to be … And it’s so hard because we’ve now seen the worst poison in the commonwealth in the Middle East and of course we’re seeing it in different ways around the world, including in our own country, is dehumanization. The inability to see the humanity in another person. And when that sets in, everything bad becomes so much easier and everything good becomes so much harder. But absent dealing on one side with the need to have their own different vision for the future, one in which there’s an acceptance of Israel and a willingness to live in peace side by side, to construct a state, not be in it for the destruction of Israel, nothing will change. But equally, if the Israelis are not willing to not only share in that vision, but actually help to realize it, it’s also going to be a dead end.

It sounds almost naive to say that in this moment, but I’m more convinced than ever that it’s absolutely necessary. Look, here’s the simple question that I ask everyone on all sides. How does this end, not just in Gaza, but more broadly? You’ve got seven million Jews living in Israel, two million Arabs, five million Palestinians between Gaza and the West Bank. So roughly seven million on each side. Despite the best wishes of extremists on both sides, no one’s going anywhere. They’re staying on both sides. So tell me how this ends absent some kind of political solution that answers the legitimate aspirations of everyone and allows Israel to live in security.

Preet Bharara:

Well, by some people’s reckoning, or at least one person’s reckoning, there’s a vision that it ends in resorts and casinos in Gaza. Is that a possibility, Tony?

Antony Blinken:

On one level, there’s nothing wrong with that, provided the Palestinians are there at home, and if that’s part of their economic future, I think great. Look, you’re in Tel Aviv. You’re in one of the beautiful hotels along the beach in Tel Aviv, and you’re looking out and you see this extraordinary city. It’s the same darn beach, just 50 miles down the road. There’s no reason it shouldn’t be that. So whatever their vision is, but it has to be for Palestinians in the first instance, and I hope it would be in Palestine when the conditions are right. And this gets to another thing. Look, again, I continue to believe strongly that the two-state solution is the worst of all possible answers, except for every other answer. I don’t see-

Preet Bharara:

Like democracy.

Antony Blinken:

Exactly.

Preet Bharara:

Like democracy, Tony.

Antony Blinken:

And I think there’s a way to get there. I think it was a mistake … I understand why they did it, and I feel it sort of as almost a moral matter, the fact that countries, including France, including the United Kingdom, including Canada, have recognized Palestine. I just don’t think it’s going to achieve very much on the ground. But there is, I think, a way forward to recognition that would be the right thing to do, the right way to do it, and really important, and that’s this. You need something that is both time-bound and conditions-based, and that sounds like a contradiction, but it’s not. These are reinforcing ideas. Time-bound in the sense that Palestinians deserve clarity about recognition, and they need something that is both clear and near in time. And if you talk about another endless process, no one’s going to believe it. So I would say that within a certain period of time, two to three years, everyone will recognize the Palestinian state. That’s distinct from resolving all of the issues that go with it. Exactly where the border is, the status of Jerusalem, the right of return. But recognition.

But I would also make it conditions-based by saying during that time, we have to make sure that the emerging Palestinian entity is committed one, to being demilitarized, two, to having a monopoly on what arms there are. In other words, all of the militia like Hamas have to be disarmed. Three, committed to reform in education and in religion and committed to necessary reform so that you don’t have a failed state. If you do that, you answer the principle Israeli objections to the recognition and ultimately the realization of a state. Because from the Israeli perspective, how can they be expected to accept a Hamas stand right next door or a failed state right next door? One that’s able also to make arrangements with Iran or other entities of Israel.

If you can answer, and there’s no reason you shouldn’t be, if you can answer those conditions, then I would say everyone should pledge that we will recognize Palestine by a date certain, and then continue as necessary directly between the parties to negotiate the so-called final status issues. The border, Jerusalem, right of return. And meanwhile, of course, Israel would have to lay off the settlements, lay off the illegal outposts, lay off the demolitions, lay off the outrageous abuse of Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, uphold the status quo of the holy sites. That’s the way to move forward in a way that answers Palestinian needs and Israeli needs for security, which has to be guaranteed if they’re going to accept a state.

Preet Bharara:

I will be right back with Secretary Blinken after this.

Can I ask an incredibly stupid question?

Antony Blinken:

No such thing, especially in the Middle East.

Preet Bharara:

What would happen if tomorrow the United States of America recognized Palestine?

Antony Blinken:

Look, again, as a practical matter, I don’t think much would result from it. I don’t think it would change anything on the ground. It might cause the Israelis to dig in even more. And in fairness to the Israelis-

Preet Bharara:

But would it be an earthquake or would it be a slight tremor? Would people freak out?

Antony Blinken:

Yes. As political matter-

Preet Bharara:

Would the proposal fall apart?

Antony Blinken:

Yeah, as a political matter, sure. It would carry some weight and I think it would cause some real tremors, shockwaves. But at the end of the day, I’m not sure would have any prospect of actually changing things. And again, I want to say in fairness to the Israelis, how can they be expected to be for a state right next door to them unless you can answer these basic questions about what that state would look like? Is it a state committed to its own construction or committed to Israel’s destruction?

Preet Bharara:

Right. No. Yeah, I wasn’t endorsing it. I just was trying to understand the cards that might be played. I’m going to ask you to do an unfair thought experiment. Assume for the sake of this thought experiment that the general political winds that are understood to exist existed for Bibi Netanyahu, that the principles of engagement with respect to a terrorist attack, a heinous terrorist attack were present. Punch in the face, be very strong. You have to be strong. Taking into account public sentiment in your own country, taking into account public sentiment in the United States, safety, future negotiations and everything else, and also understanding generally who Bibi Netanyahu is. Was there a different way for him to have handled the conduct of the war from October 7th to today that would have us in a much better position, or given the constraints that I’ve imposed on the thought experiment, were we inevitably destined to be at this point? At this time?

Antony Blinken:

The old hindsight is 2020 always applies.

Preet Bharara:

Yeah. Well, we have a benefit.

Antony Blinken:

Even with that, Preet, even with that, the short answer is I’m really not sure. I think, again, there was so much societal passion, anger, determination built up that was beyond Netanyahu or any one leader. This had so much momentum. There was such a freight train moving at 60 miles an hour down the track that I’m not sure anyone or anything could have stopped it. And I believe personally, if the United States had come to the conclusion that we shouldn’t be involved in this and said without us, it would’ve continued anyway. But by the way, and this is important too, there were so many concentric circles that had to be dealt with. One was of course, again, making sure … And this was the necessary thing to do. To try to make sure that October 7th would not happen again. And that meant, at the very least, dismantling Hamas’s military capacity, which again, the Israelis accomplished well over a year ago.

And it would also be nice to get the leaders who were responsible for the horror of October 7th, but there were other things that were necessary at the same time. One was to prevent a wider war. And it’s so easy to forget, but there were many moments when it looked like there was a real possibility that Iran would get into the act, Hezbollah would get into the act. The Houthis ended up getting into the act, but it didn’t do much fundamental damage. And there was a real risk of a much wider war. Part of averting that wider war was making sure that Israel continued to have a strong deterrent so that anyone who thought about getting into it knew that they would bear the consequences. That was important. And then of course, getting the hostages out and the plight of civilians who were caught in the middle of all of this.

We had to deal with all of those at the same time. One of the big challenges was this. Hamas was looking very carefully at what its potential saviors were doing. So was Iran going to come in? Was Hezbollah going to come in? They were also looking very carefully at the relationship between Israel and its various supporters around the world, starting with the United States. And we saw this time and again. We picked this up. Whenever they saw Israel becoming more isolated, when, for example, early on, some countries recognized Palestine, when there were ICC indictments against Netanyahu and the defense minister, when there were more in the open, some real differences between the United States and Israel over going into Rafah emerged, Hamas pulled back from the negotiations on a ceasefire. And so we were in a position where whatever we were saying to the Israelis in private, it was also important in public to try to minimize the daylight because more daylight would actually perpetuate the conflict because it would make getting to a ceasefire more difficult.

All of those things made this incredibly complex. Now, when Iran attacked Israel, that Israel not only effectively with our huge assistance, never seen before, including with Americans putting themselves in harm’s way, rallying other countries, including in the region, to defend Israel against these missile and drone attacks. Not once, but twice. When those were effectively defeated, when Israel took out Iran’s air defenses, leaving it very vulnerable, when Hezbollah was knocked back in ways it had never been before, that radically changed the equation. It minimized, if not eliminated, the possibility of a wider war because these other actors were in no position to conduct it. That sent a strong message to Hamas. Obviously eliminating some of its leadership had an effect in both directions. It sent a strong message to them. It did make negotiations more complicated. But it took a long time to get into a position where Hamas no longer thought, “Hey, the cavalry’s coming to the rescue,” or thought that we were going to abandon Israel, which would only in my judgment, have perpetuated things, not finally in our administration, landing them with a ceasefire.

Preet Bharara:

I got to move to another part of the world as I promised at the start that I would. So you go from a moment not that long ago, I’m old enough to remember as the phrase goes, when Zelensky of Ukraine comes to the White House, is berated, is humiliated from among other reasons, not wearing a suit, to this week where the same President of the United States seems to suggest that Putin is a paper tiger, says that Zelensky is a brave man and that Ukraine may be able to reclaim all the territory it’s lost. What in the hell happened? Did Zelensky buy a nice suit? Was he well-attired? That’s quite a shift. What accounts for that?

Antony Blinken:

Between the time we’re speaking today and the time this podcast drops, that could shift again.

Preet Bharara:

Things may change.

Antony Blinken:

So again, I’m a little nervous about as we guess. Look, I think-

Preet Bharara:

There’s a lot of pressure on Zelensky’s tailor. I got to say right now, I don’t want to be that guy.

Antony Blinken:

I think substituting, I don’t know, Ralph Lauren or Zegna for whoever makes the military fatigues might be a good idea, but okay.

Preet Bharara:

He should go for American Eagle.

Antony Blinken:

Even better.

Preet Bharara:

You could pile a bunch of hot button issues and memes together in one. Anyway.

Antony Blinken:

Even better. But look, I think a few things on this. First, if you look at what the president said, I was of course struck by that as well and favorably struck by the most recent statements. On the other hand, where it seemed to land was with a kind of statement like, “Well, you know what? Let everyone have at it without us. We’ll continue selling the stuff through the Europeans and through NATO, and they can keep going, and they might do pretty well. The Russians are going to do what they’re going to do, and we’re out of this.”

Preet Bharara:

You think it was a statement of withdrawal?

Antony Blinken:

It could be read that way, but the devil’s in the details because if we continue to make sure that the Ukrainians have the arms that they need, if we continue to provide them with the intelligence that they need to prosecute their defense effectively, then as long as there’s money there, and that’s very achievable if the Europeans finally agree to use the frozen sovereign assets, $300 billion in Europe that could be accessed if they agree to do that. And I think that’s going to happen because the Europeans, I think are committed to Ukraine. They’re committed to continuing the support. But if the choice for a European politician is between their taxpayers paying for it and using Russian sovereign assets, I think I know what they’re going to choose. But if that’s the case, then I think Ukraine can continue to get the support it needs, and hopefully, finally, we can get to a point where Russia realizes that it’s not going to outlast anyone, and Ukrainians can negotiate an end to this from a position of relative strength. On the other hand, Preet, if we’re really out of this, if they’re not getting the necessary weapons from us, if they’re not getting the intelligence support, it’s going to be a lot harder.

And there’s something else that’s going on in the same timeframe. You’re seeing Russia test almost every single day NATO and the United States is at the heart of NATO. They’re testing to see whether we remain serious about NATO. And one of the things that I think we’ve not done a good job of explaining to our own people as well as to people around the world, why NATO was so important and why this extraordinary 80 year investment has made so much sense. Because I get it. From the perspective of many Americans, including many people in the president’s base, they don’t want any more foreign wars. They don’t want any more entanglements. We had two decades of Iraq and Afghanistan. We don’t want to continue that. I get it. The irony is this. The best possible guarantee against that in Europe is NATO. Because the genius of NATO, the power of NATO is this thing called Article five. The idea that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that means that any would-be aggressor thinking about going at one of the countries in NATO has to say to themselves, “If I take this country on, I’m taking them all on.” And that’s the best deterrent for conflict starting in the first place. It’s the very reason why a NATO country has never been attacked by Russia. Countries on the periphery that are not in NATO, that don’t benefit from Article five have been.

Preet Bharara:

Right. So what do you say to the folks who proclaim that the dangling of NATO membership to Ukraine and it’s flirting with wanting to join NATO actually is the thing that provoked Putin into the war?

Antony Blinken:

I spent so much time on this, including lots of conversations with the Russians trying to understand what was going on, what their … Not only what their intent was, which we had pretty good information on, but what this was really about. And we tested the proposition. We really did. In direct conversations and negotiations, in conversations between NATO and Russia, in conversations between the organization for security and cooperation in Europe and Russia. Is this about some=.

Preet Bharara:

What was the result of those tests?

Antony Blinken:

The result of the tests were answered fully in February of ’22. The result of the test was no, this was not about Ukraine joining NATO someday. This was not about some perceived threat posed by NATO, Ukraine, some combination thereof to Russia. It was all about Putin’s conviction, his belief that Ukraine should be part of Russia, that it was not an independent state, that it was a historic mistake to allow its independence.

Preet Bharara:

In your view, that was a pretext?

Antony Blinken:

I believe it was a pretext. And again, don’t take my word for it. If you actually read what Putin himself has said time and again about Ukraine and about in his view, the view that this is integral to Russia and his efforts to recreate a greater Russia, that’s what this is about.

Preet Bharara:

You talked about what Europeans need to choose. Do they need to choose not to buy Russian oil?

Antony Blinken:

Look, we’ve seen an incredible transformation already in the energy picture in Europe. And if you looked at where Europe was before the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine and where they are now, they’ve already taken steps that no one thought possible, especially on the gas side. They’ve dramatically, dramatically decreased their dependence on Russia. We filled in with LNG from the United States. That process is a little bit more complicated on oil, so they need to continue. But it’s interesting because you have to get the balance right. If you get to a point where so much oil is being kept off the market that prices go up and consumers feel it, their support for continuing the effort may prove to be very, very fragile. So we put in place a system that had a price cap such that countries that continued to buy oil from Russia would do so, but the price would be capped so that the profits that Russia would get from it were minimized, and yet oil energy was kept on the market so that prices for everyone stayed down and we sustained public support for this effort.

Preet Bharara:

Did your administration have any real dialogue during the transition with the next administration? And did it happen in 2020, or did each administration just sort of show up and do its own thing without the benefit or burden of talking to the prior’s?

Antony Blinken:

So my recollection in 2020, Preet, is that there was virtually none. And of course there were reasons for that in the moment. This time around in 2024, there was certainly more, and it varies from agency to agency, but by and large, there was real communication. Look, the best transition I ever took part in was the transition from the second Bush administration to the Obama administration. The Bush people were sensational in making sure that we were fully, fully up to speed. I did the National Security Council transition for Obama. Steve Hadley, who was running the NSC then for Bush, and his entire team could not have been better in making sure we had everything we needed. We had many, many, many conversations with all of the experts at the White House on the NSC, voluminous briefing books, etc. I wanted to replicate that. I tried to do that in 2016. I happened to be at the State Department then as the deputy secretary to John Kerry and was determined to do it again this time around. So we put everything on the table, and again, I think there was greater receptivity than in 2016, and it was certainly better than in 2020 when it was pretty much non-existent.

Preet Bharara:

Putting aside its bad escalators and its bad teleprompters, is the UN a broken institution?

Antony Blinken:

The first Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, said that the purpose of this institution is not to lead us to heaven, but to save us from hell. So I think the expectations for what the organization can do, keeping in mind that the UN is what? It’s not its own entity. It’s not like artificial general intelligence that takes a life of its own on.

Preet Bharara:

It’s like a rotary club.

Antony Blinken:

It’s its members and a function of what they’re investing in it, what they’re committing to it, how they’re getting along is going to manifest itself in whether the organization’s performing or not. Look, I think you can look at this politically and you can look at it practically. Politically, it’s usually challenged. There are moments when actually the political will of the UN does make a difference. For example, going back to Gaza very, very briefly, I promise. When President Biden put out a framework agreement for a ceasefire way back in June of ’24 and put it out in detail in public as a way of getting everyone behind it and putting all the parties in a corner to accept it or not, the UN Security Council came along and voted to endorse it 14 to nothing. The Russians didn’t vote against it, they abstained.

And that carries some real weight. And in fact, we got agreement to the framework, including from Hamas, and then things happened that delayed its implementation. So politically it can have a utility. Practically, look, you know this. Leaving aside everything else, millions of people are housed, clothed, fed, given medical attention of the most challenged people on Earth because of UN agencies. And if you pull that away, if you take that away, well, either those people are not going to get what they need or someone else is going to have to do it. We have over a hundred thousand UN peacekeepers in various-

Preet Bharara:

We have USAID for that. Oh, right. No, we don’t. We don’t have that anymore. Right. Sorry.

Antony Blinken:

And that, by the way, since you mentioned it, let me just say this. I understand people come in and they say, “We can save money. We can be more efficient. There’s bloat and waste in government.” Of course. But here’s the thing. If you’re really trying to save money and really take a whack at the deficit, you ask the American people, and we see this in poll after poll, hey, how much money have we been spending on USAID, the State Department, our foreign assistance, our foreign aid? The answer you generally get back is, oh, people think we’re spending 25% of the federal budget on that. Then you ask them, how much should we be spending? And they say, oh, 10% would be a good number. How much were we actually spending? 1% of the federal budget. So if you’re trying to save money, that’s not the place to do it. And the impact you get for those few dollars is totally disproportionate to that small amount of money, and that rug being pulled out from under is terrible.

Preet Bharara:

I have two more questions about the UN. One is the quote you offered earlier, it’s not there to take us to heaven, but there to save us from hell.

Antony Blinken:

Yeah.

Preet Bharara:

What’s an example of a recent time where the UN saved us from hell?

Antony Blinken:

Oh gosh.

Preet Bharara:

Is there one?

Antony Blinken:

You can look at virtually every conflict place in the world, which arguably has fallacious aspects to it, but they would be far worse without the UN or the UN agencies. If you look at the work of the World Food Program, if you look at the work of UNICEF, I can take you from a dozen countries in Africa to many other places around the world.

Preet Bharara:

It’s the aid programs. What about in terms of resolving conflicts?

Antony Blinken:

Resolving conflicts, look, in partnership often with us as well as with others, I think the UN can play a really important role. For example, we managed to get in Yemen after what was probably the worst humanitarian situation in the world when we took office. We finally got an enduring ceasefire, and then of course, you had a whole other problem with the Houthis after Gaza. But this horrific back and forth after the Houthis took over much of Yemen with the Saudis, with the Emiratis and others on the other side, and civilians, again, caught in the middle. We got a ceasefire there. And I have to tell you that the UN representative was instrumental in working with us to get that done.

Preet Bharara:

Peacekeeping. Are they pretty good at that?

Antony Blinken:

Look, peacekeeping record is very checkered. But here’s another example of where from the United States’ perspective, yes, you want to make it better, you want to improve it. But here’s the deal, Preet. I’m not sure what the number is today, but at any given time, they’re roughly a hundred thousand UN peacekeepers. You know how many of those are Americans? Maybe a couple of hundred. So this is a pretty good deal for us because you’ve got others who are stepping up, doing the really hard work at peacekeeping in the most difficult places around the world. Yeah, we pay a chunk of the budget for that, but we don’t have Americans doing it. That’s a pretty good deal.

Preet Bharara:

Do you give Donald Trump any credit, considerable amount of credit, some credit for bringing the spending of NATO members up to snuff?

Antony Blinken:

When we took office, by we, I mean President Biden in 2020, nine of NATO’s then 32 members were meeting the budget requirement that had been set way back in 2014 to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Nine. Right? When we left office, 23 of its members were meeting the mark, and the rest were on a trajectory to do it.

Preet Bharara:

So it was you guys?

Antony Blinken:

No. I’ll tell you who I really give the credit to. We tried to do it by persuasion and we made a real difference. President Trump has another way of doing it, and people made further progress, but I really have to give credit where it’s due to Vladimir Putin.

Preet Bharara:

Right. I see what you did there.

Secretary Anthony Blinken, good luck on writing your book. Thank you for your insights, particularly this week, and we’ll see how your predictions turn out. Thank you so much.

Antony Blinken:

Thanks, Preet. Great to be with you.

Preet Bharara:

My conversation with Secretary Blinken continues for members of the Cafe Insider Community. In the bonus for insiders, he shares his thoughts on his successor, Secretary Marco Rubio.

Antony Blinken:

I do think it’s important to have a national security advisor distinct from the Secretary of State because there’s a very distinct job.

Preet Bharara:

To try out the membership, head to cafe.com/insider. Again, that’s cafe.com/insider. Stay tuned. After the break, I’ll answer your questions about the Comey indictment.

Now, let’s get to your questions.

Preet Bharara:

This question comes in a voicemail from Laura.

Laura:

Hey, Preet. The James Comey indictment got me wondering. When prosecutors bring a case to the grand jury, do they have to share evidence that might help the defendant, or do they usually just present the evidence that supports an indictment? Thanks.

Preet Bharara:

Laura, that is a great question and very relevant to probably a lot of matters, not just the Comey matter. So prosecutors actually have very broad discretion over what kind of evidence they present to a grand jury. But it might be helpful. We haven’t done this in a while, given how much talk there is about this institution, the grand jury. Let me explain what a grand jury is one more time. So as I’ve mentioned in the past, the grand jury is right in the Constitution itself. It’s in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which says that for federal felonies, no person shall be held to answer “unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury”. So it is not a creature of norm or guideline or mere statute. It is a right of constitutional dimension. So what’s the purpose of the right to indictment by grand jury?

The core job is, I guess, to act as a buffer between the government and the accused to make sure prosecutors can’t send someone to trial for a serious crime without first at least convincing a group of regular citizens that there’s enough evidence to establish probable cause. Of course, at the end of the day, the standard of proof at trial is much, much higher. It’s not a majority of the jurors, it’s unanimous jury, and it’s not probable cause, it’s beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, in theory, at least grand juries are meant to protect against baseless charges. In reality, their effectiveness depends a good bit on what evidence the prosecutor chooses to present and the good faith of the prosecutors who are bringing the case. At the federal level, there is no statute that requires prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence. That’s evidence that tends to show someone may not be guilty of the crime at issue.

Various states do have that requirement. The federal system does not. In fact, in a 1992 case called United States v Williams, the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts cannot force prosecutors to present evidence favorable to the defendant during grand jury proceedings. That however, doesn’t end the question because the Justice Department, the one I served for a very, very long time, made it a point to provide ethical and fairness guidelines for its prosecutors. So the Justice Department, as in a lot of other contexts as well, adopted a higher standard than the law required. The justice manual says, “When a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment.” So that’s quite an important statement. While there’s no legal obligation under federal law, there’s a departmental policy that federal prosecutors are supposed to follow and prosecutors who ignore it could presumably face disciplinary action.

I’m not aware of that section of the justice manual having been revised or appealed or modified or mitigated in the current administration. One question that I’ve raised with respect to the Comey indictment is what, if any, exculpatory information was put before the grand jury in that case? And as we have been discussing on this podcast, and as I discussed with Joyce again this week on the Insider Podcast, there’s a decent amount of exculpatory evidence that arguably should have been put before the grand jury. So I’m very curious to see what happened in that grand jury proceeding. So what’s the bottom line if a prosecutor doesn’t do what the manual requires? Well, even if a prosecutor disregards the DOJ’s rules and fails to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, as you’ll hear in the next question, that evidence could eventually come to light.

This question comes in an email from Mark who writes, “If an Erik Siebert memo exists explaining why he believed there wasn’t enough evidence for a grand jury to indict James Comey, could the defense compel its disclosure? And if that memo included exculpatory information, would the defense have the right to access it?” So that’s a great follow-on question after the last one that I answered. By way of background, the reporting is that there is a memo apparently signed by and overseen by Erik Siebert, but I believe also may have the signatures and the endorsement of a number of career staff in that U.S. attorney’s office as well, that is what’s called a declination memo, which basically says not necessarily that there wasn’t hypothetically enough evidence for a grand jury to indict, but presumably says it’s not proper and appropriate to proceed with the prosecution because there’s not enough evidence at the end of the day to convict.

So what happens to a memo like that? Can the defense get ahold of it? Can anyone else get ahold of it? Well, there is a rule in the federal rules of criminal procedure that govern what discovery has to be given to the other side. Obviously, exculpatory evidence does have to be, even if it’s not required to be presented in the grand jury, ultimately evidence that tends to show innocence has to be provided during discovery. Does the memo qualify? Well, rule 16, as I mentioned, makes clear that work product, that’s the deliberative work done by lawyers on a particular side of a case. It can include reports, memoranda, other internal government documents created by prosecutors. That work product, generally speaking, is protected from disclosure, and that makes a good amount of sense. And what that means is a memo written by U.S. Attorney Erik Siebert to his staff or with his staff, would normally stay off limits in the same way that a memo that suggests legal exposure or legal risk or peril on the part of the defending wouldn’t be disclosable to the government pretty much ever.

And even if the memo were turned over or became public, the fact that previous prosecutors on a case made an assessment not to proceed with the case or advised against proceeding with the case wouldn’t really be usable at trial. That’s an opinion of a prosecutor in a particular matter, and it wouldn’t be admissible. Juries decide cases based facts, not on whether one prosecutor once believed the case was strong or weak. Now, there could be items in the memo that would be relevant that would speak to or call out evidence that would make its way into the trial. So for example, if the memo went into detail and listed the facts and findings behind the conclusion, documents, testimony of other witnesses that tend to undermine the conclusion of guilt, those would have to be handed over. So in the ordinary course, and we’re not talking about the ordinary course here, but even in the extraordinary course here, it’s hard to see a situation in which through ordinary discovery and disclosure, even that declination memo comes to light for purposes of the trial at trial.

However, as lots of people have been talking about and speculating about and opining about, it will likely be the case that Jim Comey and his lawyers will make motions to dismiss the indictment. And one or two of the bases on which they might make such a motion is on the grounds of selective prosecution or vindictive prosecution. And you can imagine the argument would go as follows. Donald Trump and people around Donald Trump have made clear his intention, desire, and will to investigate, prosecute and imprison Jim Comey, his longtime political enemy, and to show that the prosecution was vindictive or that the prosecution was selective. They will want to show the irregularity of the process by which Jim Comey came to be indicted. And in my experience, there’s been no more irregular process than this. The story is you had reasonable, responsible people in the office of the Eastern District of Virginia who concluded that Jim Comey should not be prosecuted.

The head of that office was forced out, either fired or resigned depending on whose point of view you believe. And then a new lawyer came in as we’ve been discussing for the last week, and notwithstanding that memo proceeded with the prosecution and went to the grand jury. And so the argument would be that the president wanted Comey arrested and prosecuted and charged whatever the evidence says, whatever the law says, no matter what. And what could be better proof of that than an existing memo that came to the opposite conclusion that was then thrown in the dustbin and overruled by someone who used to be the president’s own personal lawyer who had never practiced criminal law before. That I think you can powerfully argue is evidence of vindictiveness and prejudgment of Jim Comey’s case.

Well, that’s it for this episode of Stay Tuned. Thanks again to my guest, Secretary Antony Blinken. If you like what we do, rate and review the show on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen. Every positive review helps new listeners find the show. Send me your questions about news, politics, and justice. Tweet them to me at @PreetBharara with the hashtag #AskPreet. You can also now reach me on BlueSky, or you can call and leave me a message at 833-997-7338. That’s 833-99-PREET. Or you can send an email to letters@cafe.com. Stay Tuned is presented by CAFE and the Vox Media Podcast Network. The executive producer is Tamara Sepper. The technical director is David Tatasciore. The deputy editor is Celine Rohr. The editorial producers are Noa Azulai and Jake Kaplan. The associate producer is Claudia Hernández and the CAFE team is Matthew Billy and Liana Greenway. Our music is by Andrew Dost. I’m your host, Preet Bharara. As always, Stay Tuned.