On Thursday, June 5, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that members of majority groups need not meet a higher evidentiary standard to bring a discrimination claim. The ruling will make it easier for individuals to file reverse discrimination claims across the country.

What is this case about?

• In 2019, Marlean A. Ames, a heterosexual woman, applied for a promotion with the Ohio Department of Youth Services, an agency she had worked for since 2004 and which operates Ohio’s juvenile correctional system. Although Ames interviewed for the role, the position was ultimately given to a gay woman. The woman awarded the job lacked a college degree (unlike Ames) and had spent less time than Ames working at the department. Shortly thereafter, Ames was demoted, and a gay man was hired to fill her prior, more senior position.
• Ames subsequently filed a discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Ames claimed she had been the subject of reverse discrimination on the basis of her sex. (The Supreme Court has previously held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.)
• The text of Title VII does not itself require that discrimination claimants be members of a minority group. However, some courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, have imposed a higher burden on members of majority groups, requiring that, in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, they prove “background circumstances” supporting their suspicion of discrimination. 
• The question before SCOTUS was whether, under the text of Title VII or the Supreme Court’s precedents, members of majority groups must prove such “background circumstances” in order to meet their evidentiary burden in a discrimination case. 
• Both conservatives and the Biden administration supported Ames’ position during the litigation. 

What happened in the courts?

• District Court: The district court ruled in favor of the Ohio agency, relying on Sixth Circuit precedent requiring that Ames provide evidence of “background circumstances” to support her claim that her employer discriminates against members of a majority group. Absent such evidence, individuals in a majority group, including a straight woman like Ames, could not successfully bring a discrimination claim. 
• Sixth Circuit: The appeals court affirmed, finding Ames had failed to meet her evidentiary burden because she had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
• Circuit Split: Circuits were split as to whether majority-group plaintiffs indeed carried a higher evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs in proving a discrimination claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split. 

What is the underlying McDonnell Douglas framework?

• In a unanimous 1973 decision involving a black civil rights activist alleging racial discrimination by his employer, the Supreme Court established a three-part burden-shifting framework for evaluating employment discrimination claims. 
• First, the individual claiming discrimination must establish a “prima facie” claim (that is, a claim which, taken at face value, has merit) of discrimination. (It is at this stage that certain courts, including the Sixth Circuit, imposed the “background circumstances” rules.)
• The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse decision. 
• Finally, the plaintiff must rebut the given reason as pretextual (that is, demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is merely an excuse) and demonstrate that the real reason was discrimination.   

What did the Supreme Court decide?

• Holding: “[T]he Sixth Circuit’s ‘background circumstances’ rule cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or our longstanding precedents.” 
• Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, writing for a unanimous court, explained, “As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Rather, the provision makes it unlawful ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual…” 
• Justice Jackson reasoned that the Court’s prior cases “make[] clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.” 
• The Court accordingly vacated the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and sent the case back to the district court to evaluate Ames’ claim without applying the “background circumstances” rule.

 What did the concurring justices say?

• Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch, to separately “highlight the problems that arise when judges create atextual legal rules and frameworks.” Thomas criticizes McDonnell Douglas as “lack[ing] any basis in the text of Title VII,” and says he would be willing to reconsider the framework altogether as “a workable and useful evidentiary tool.” 
• According to Thomas, such “judge-made doctrines” are difficult for courts to apply. The “background circumstances” rule, for instance, “requires courts to perform the difficult—if not impossible—task of deciding whether a particular plaintiff qualifies as a member of the so-called ‘majority.’” Thomas argues this inquiry could yield different answers depending on how one “defines the boundaries of a population.” In response, courts and judges have simply “abandoned the search for neutral principles and instead assum[ed] that the ‘background circumstances’ rule applies only to white and male plaintiffs….In other words, courts with this rule have enshrined into Title VII’s antidiscrimination law an explicitly race-based preference: White plaintiffs must prove the existence of background circumstances, while nonwhite plaintiffs need not do so.” 
• In a footnote, Thomas also rejects the premise that it is only the “rare” or “unusual” employer who would be inclined to discriminate against a majority group. In Thomas’s telling, “a number of this Nation’s largest and most prestigious employers have overtly discriminated against those they deem members of so-called majority groups. American employers have long been ‘obsessed’ with ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ initiatives and affirmative action plans. Initiatives of this kind have often led to overt discrimination against those perceived to be in the majority.”

What are the decision’s consequences?

• As a result of the Court’s decision, employment discrimination claims will be adjudicated irrespective of an individual’s membership in a majority or minority group. In other words, members of a majority group will not be required as a legal matter to meet a higher evidentiary burden to bring their case.
• Moving forward, this ruling could pave the way for individuals who believe they have suffered adverse consequences as a result of DEI initiatives in the workplace or in other contexts to file lawsuits alleging discrimination. While the decision won’t necessarily guarantee an easier path for majority-group litigants, the holding ensures that such litigants will not be subject to a higher evidentiary burden than minority-group litigants. 

You can find all the legal documents here.